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Abstract 
We analyse the wide array of rescue programmes adopted in several countries, 
following Lehman Brothers’ default in September 2008, in order to support banks and other 
financial institutions. We first provide an overview of the programmes, comparing their 
characteristics, magnitudes and participation rates across countries. We then consider the 
effects of the programmes on banks’ risk and valuation, looking at the behaviour of CDS 
premia and stock prices. We then proceed to analyse the issuance of government guaranteed 
bonds by banks, examining their impact on banks’ funding and highlighting undesired effects 
and distortions. Finally, we briefly review the recent evolution of bank lending to the private 
sector. We draw policy implications, in particular as regards the way of mitigating the 
distortions implied by such programmes and the need for an exit strategy.  
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 Introduction and executive summary
1 
Since the crisis intensified in September 2008, following the collapse of Lehman Brothers, 
governments in advanced economies have stepped in to provide support to banks and 
financial institutions, through both standalone actions directed at individual institutions and 
system-wide programmes. The measures introduced have consisted of: (i) capital injections 
to strengthen banks’ capital base; (ii) explicit guarantees on liabilities to help banks retain 
access to wholesale funding; and (iii) purchases or guarantees of impaired legacy assets to 
help reduce banks’ exposure to large losses.
2 The objective of such intervention was to 
avoid widespread bankruptcies of financial intermediaries and to contribute to restoring a 
normal functioning of financial intermediation.  
                                                
This paper provides an overview of the government support measures introduced between 
September 2008 and June 2009 and an account of their effects on banks and on the 
functioning of credit and financial markets.  
Overview of the support measures 
Governments became crucial during the crisis, as traditional sources of funding for financial 
institutions dried up. Banks’ issuance of debt securities and equity instruments dropped off 
considerably in the third and fourth quarters of 2008. Bank mergers and acquisitions, which 
could have provided a private sector solution to bank restructuring, also remained subdued.  
Against this background, the magnitude of the actions taken to support the banking system 
has been unprecedented. The overall amount of resources committed to the various 
packages by the 11 countries examined
3 totalled around €5 trillion or 18.8% of GDP; the 
outlays have been €2 trillion or 7.6% of GDP. The size of the interventions varies greatly 
across countries: it is higher in countries such as the United Kingdom and the Netherlands 
(where outlays have reached 44.1% and 16.6% of GDP, respectively) where the banking 
system is large relative to the real economy and is dominated by large institutions that have 
been severely hit by the crisis. It is lower in countries such as Japan (0.1% of GDP) and Italy 
(0.6%) where banks are more focused on traditional credit activities and so far have been 
less affected by the crisis. 
Actions for addressing capital shortages and funding difficulties have been widespread and 
have mostly taken the form of system-wide programmes. Measures for improving the quality 
of bank assets have been less common and have mainly targeted individual large 
institutions. However, some of the most recent initiatives include comprehensive schemes for 
dealing with illiquid or “bad” assets. Among banks that participate in both recapitalisation and 
debt guarantee programmes, the intermediaries that have received more capital (in relation 
 
1   Fabio Panetta (fabio.panetta@bancaditalia.it), Giuseppe Grande, Aviram Levy, Federico M Signoretti, Marco 
Taboga and Andrea Zaghini are from Banca d’Italia. Thomas Faeh, Corrinne Ho and Michael King are from 
the Bank for International Settlements. Some of the analyses reported in this paper were initially carried out 
with a view to providing inputs to the activity of the Committee on the Global Financial System. We are 
indebted to Leonardo Gambacorta for his contribution at the early stage of the project. Andrea Cardillo, Reto 
Hausmann and Mario Sanna provided excellent research assistance; thanks are also due to Angelika 
Donaubauer for graph production and to Thekla Grimm, Cynthia Lloyd and Tom Minic for editorial assistance. 
All errors are our own. 
2   A number of countries have also strengthened their deposit insurance scheme to help prevent bank runs. 
3   Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Spain, Switzerland, the United Kingdom 
and the United States. 
 
 
5to shareholder equity) have also issued more liabilities under guarantee (in relation to total 
liabilities). Moreover, most instances of asset purchase/guarantee occurred after earlier 
capital injections, suggesting that this option was used after a first phase of government 
support failed to fully restore confidence in troubled institutions. 
The average uptake rate by eligible institutions (ie the ratio of outlays under a given 
programme to total commitments) is higher for capital injections (around 50%) than for debt 
guarantees (less than 20%). The United Kingdom has the highest participation rate for both 
capital injections and debt guarantees, possibly reflecting the relatively small number of 
major banks and the tailoring of government programmes to their needs. A small number of 
ready-to-use programmes have seen zero participation so far. 
For debt guarantees, the flat-fee scheme implemented in the United States – more 
favourable, in principle, for riskier banks than the European schemes, where fees vary with 
the bank’s riskiness – did not induce a higher participation rate: indeed the US uptake ratio is 
lower than the average one for the European countries included in the sample.  
The effects on bank risk and valuation  
Have government measures contributed to restoring the soundness of and confidence in the 
banking system? Analysing CDS premia for large international banks, our main findings are:  
(i)  Government interventions have been effective in reducing banks’ default risk, at 
least over a short time horizon. On average, the announcement of system-wide 
rescue packages was followed by a fall in CDS premia, especially for 
announcements of capital injections.  
(ii)  Bank CDS premia have shown a further reduction when the government measures 
were actually implemented, under both comprehensive rescue programmes and 
standalone initiatives.  
(iii)  The reduction of default risk is correlated with the amount of resources pledged, in 
particular with the size of capital injections.  
(iv)  There seem to be positive spillover effects across countries: some countries’ CDS 
spreads showed “early declines” after the announcements of packages by others.  
Unlike CDS premia, bank stock prices in general did not show a positive reaction to the 
announcement of the rescue packages. Although in some countries immediately after the 
announcements banks’ equities showed a slightly positive reaction, in all cases prices 
eventually fell to levels substantially below the pre-announcement levels. This may reflect 
several factors. First, capital injections at low prices substantially dilute investors’ earning 
rights (ie the right to get a fraction of future earnings), thus penalising existing shareholders. 
In some cases, governments intervened by subscribing common stock, thus also diluting 
shareholders’ voting rights. Second, concerns about national governments becoming 
important stakeholders might have negatively affected investors’ perception of banks’ long-
run profitability, thus contributing to the depression of market prices. Finally, uncertainty 
regarding the duration of the interventions and the lack of a credible exit strategy for 
governments might have increased uncertainty, thus raising the risk premium on banks’ 
equities. 
Overall, our analysis suggests that rescue packages have contributed to reducing banks’ 
probability of default, to the benefit of creditors and CDS protection sellers. This result has 
 
 
6been achieved in part by redistributing resources from shareholders to creditors, as it 
emerges from the opposite reactions of banks’ CDS premia and stock prices.
4 
Government-guaranteed bond issuance by banks  
We then analyse the issuance of government-guaranteed bonds by banks and draw the 
attention to, inter alia, a number of undesired side effects and distortions related to such 
guarantees.  
The issuance of guaranteed bonds has been sizeable across regions and has provided 
banks with an important source of funding: as of May 2009, roughly 900 bonds totalling 
around the equivalent of €700 billion had been issued worldwide by 140 financial institutions. 
The guarantees have allowed banks to refinance maturing debt, although the intensity of the 
rollover differs across intermediaries and countries. For some 50 banks which had bonds 
maturing over the period examined (October 2008–May 2009), the median rollover ratio was 
1.5 (ie issuance of guaranteed debt was equal to one and a half times the amount of matured 
non-guaranteed debt). At the country level, the median ratio ranged from 0.5 in Germany to 
8.5 in the United Kingdom. 
As mentioned, the guarantees may have caused undesired side effects or even distortions.  
First and foremost is the significant tiering of spreads at issuance paid by banks from 
different countries. Banks with the same rating but different nationality have paid markedly 
different spreads. In some cases, banks with a better rating have paid much larger spreads 
than banks with a lower rating. We show that these differences can be quite large. For 
example, for bonds issued by banks rated A, the range is close to 80 basis points (from 
20 basis points for some US banks to 100 basis points for some Spanish banks). 
Econometric analysis indicates that the differences between the spreads paid by individual 
banks reflect to a large extent the characteristics of the sovereign guarantor (such as its 
rating or the timeliness of payments in case of default of the issuer), whereas bank-specific 
factors (such as its credit risk) play only a minor role. This finding represents an example of 
the distortions that may stem from government intervention, because it implies that “weak” 
banks from “strong” countries may have access to cheaper funding than “strong” banks from 
“weak” countries. Such a pricing of risk is not what one would expect in a well functioning 
and efficient market. 
The paper also highlights other types of possible side effects of the guarantees. First, 
guaranteed issuance may have come at the expense of (ie crowded out) non-guaranteed 
issuance – less so in the euro area, where issuance of both asset classes has moved 
together, and in the United States; more so in the case of the United Kingdom, especially 
after January 2009. Second, a large portion of the guaranteed bonds have been issued by 
large banks, which have also recorded very large volumes of writedowns. This might suggest 
that the rescue programmes may be de facto subsidising large and complex financial 
institutions, which according to some commentators were at the root of the ongoing crisis 
and may be less likely to use the funds raised to increase lending to the real economy. Third, 
survey and market information on the investor base of guaranteed bonds in the euro area 
indicates that a large portion of guaranteed bonds (much larger than for non-guaranteed 
                                                  
4   This redistribution of resources could be considered unfair towards shareholders. However, shareholders bear 
non-negligible responsibilities for the eruption of the financial crisis, due to their insufficient monitoring of the 
banks they owned. Moreover, in order to attain the ultimate goal of rescuing banks, governments might have 
had no choice but to protect creditors (bondholders and depositors) at the expense of shareholders, in view of 
the fact that debt represents a much larger portion of banks’ liabilities than equity. 
 
 
7bank bonds) is bought by domestic investors, in particular banks. This may signal that 
guaranteed bonds are contributing to a partial re-segmentation of the euro area bond market 
and, as far as the major role of banks among investors is concerned, that these bonds may 
not be stimulating lending to the real economy but just lending to other banks.  
Effects on the supply of bank credit 
The paper provides some background information which may be useful for assessing 
whether rescue measures are proving effective in supporting credit supply to the private 
sector, which is their ultimate objective. This kind of assessment is fraught with conceptual 
and statistical pitfalls, related, inter alia, to the very short sample period available, to the 
difficulty of disentangling the effects of rescue measures from those of other factors at work 
(some of them policy-related) and to the fact that lending policies reflect several bank 
characteristics, only some of which are observable. Subject to these caveats, evidence from 
aggregate credit data shows that, at the end of 2008 and in early 2009, bank lending to firms 
and households kept slowing both in the United States and in Europe. Evidence from lending 
surveys and from loan pricing would suggest that the slowdown reflects both supply and 
demand factors. Credit conditions may have eased somewhat as of late, after the extreme 
tensions registered following the Lehman default, in terms of both credit standards and 
spreads on loans. It is, however, premature to conclude that the credit supply cycle has 
reached a turning point. In order to provide a more accurate assessment of the effect of 
rescue measures on bank credit, it will be necessary – and this is an avenue for further 
research – to look into the lending behaviour of individual institutions over a longer time 
span. 
The need for an exit strategy 
Overall, it is fair to say that the rescue measures have contributed to an avoidance of “worst 
case scenarios”, in particular by reducing the default risk of major banks. Before the 
interventions, financial markets were not providing sufficient long-term funding to banks. On 
a net basis, capital markets were subtracting resources from banks. The measures 
implemented since September 2008 have mitigated the effects of this anomaly. 
Governments have played the role that is usually played by capital markets, supplying long-
term resources to banks at reasonable cost, thus contributing to the stabilisation of the 
financial system. The fact that no major credit event took place after Lehman’s demise is 
certainly due, at least in part, to the implementation of the rescue measures. 
At the same time, government intervention has not been sufficient, at least so far, to trigger a 
“virtuous circle” for banks, such as a mutually reinforcing increase in capital and borrowing 
on the one hand and lending and profits on the other. Indeed, between the first and the 
second quarter of 2009, the portion of overall bank funding provided or guaranteed by 
governments sharply declined – in the case of bank bond issuance, this portion dropped from 
60% to 30% – but this increase in risk appetite may prove transitory and most banks 
continue to depend on government funds. 
The rescue measures have been effective in stabilising the financial system, but this has 
come at a price, represented by the distortions and inefficiencies mentioned above. This is 
an example of the trade-off that exists between the stability and the efficiency of the financial 
system. The existence of these distortions has two important implications. 
First of all, the distortions induced by government intervention should be taken into account 
in the design of the rescue measures. For example, bond guarantee programmes generally 
 
 
8expire at the end of 2009 but it cannot be ruled out that the authorities will decide to extend 
them into 2010. In such a case, in order to ensure a level playing field across countries, the 
pricing of the guarantees on bank bonds could be modified in a way that takes into account 
country-specific factors. For instance, “weaker” countries could be allowed to charge lower 
fees to their banks, in particular in the euro area, in order to offset those large differences in 
the cost of issuing bonds which are unrelated to the issuer’s characteristics. 
A second implication is that, in order to contain the distortions, governments should 
dismantle the rescue measures as soon as financial market conditions allow. Even if it may 
take some time until these conditions materialise, governments should start preparing an exit 
strategy right now. A credible, quick-to-implement exit strategy is key to avoiding banks and 
other financial institutions devising their future strategies on the assumption that they will 
continue to benefit from government support for an extended period of time, possibly at the 
expense of their competitors. 
The condition for dismantling the rescue measures without consequences for banks and for a 
successful exit strategy is to trigger the above-mentioned virtuous circle, in particular as far 
as funding is concerned. In this regard, a key ingredient for success is the resumption of the 
market for securitisation, which has represented a very important source of funding for banks 
until it dried up because of the financial crisis. 
 
 
91.  Government support and developments in bank financing 
Since the full violence of the financial crisis erupted in mid-September 2008, following the 
collapse of Lehman Brothers, governments in virtually all advanced industrial economies 
have stepped in to provide support to banks and financial institutions, introducing both 
standalone actions directed at individual distressed institutions and system-wide support 
programmes (or even multi-programme packages). These measures have included 
reinforced deposit insurance to help prevent bank runs, capital injections to strengthen 
banks’ capital base, explicit guarantees on liabilities to help banks retain access to wholesale 
funding, and purchases or guarantees of impaired “legacy” assets to help reduce the 
exposure of banks to large losses in their asset portfolios. The overall objective of such 
massive intervention was to avoid widespread bankruptcies of financial intermediaries and to 
contribute to restoring a normal functioning of financial intermediation.
5  
Government intervention became crucial during the crisis as traditional sources of funding for 
financial institutions dried up. In particular, financial institutions’ issuance of debt securities 
and equity instruments dropped off considerably in the third and fourth quarters of 2008. 
Merger and acquisition (M&A) activity in the banking sector, which could have provided a 
private sector solution to bank restructuring, also remained subdued compared to preceding 
years. Although large-scale government support may have had side effects – for example, by 
slowing or even crowding out the revival of non-guaranteed funding and private sector 
investment in the banking sector – it has no doubt played a crucial role in stabilising banking 
markets, by meeting funding demands that could not have been fulfilled via the traditional 
channels during the height of the crisis.  
This chapter provides an overview of the government support measures introduced since 
September 2008 and an account of the changes in the way banks financed themselves 
during this period. Section 1.1 reviews the timeline of events, identifying several distinct 
phases with respect to the introduction of government support measures in 11 industrial 
economies. Section 1.2 highlights the key cross-country patterns in adoption, magnitude and 
participation rate of such measures and seeks to relate any notable cross-country differences 
to the design or terms of the different schemes. Finally, Section 1.3 rounds up with a review 
of the evolution of the sources of bank financing before and after the introduction of 
government support measures, analysing also to what extent M&As have played a role in 
facilitating bank restructuring in the crisis. 
1.1  Government support measures: what has been done since September 2008? 
This section takes stock of the measures adopted between September 2008 and 10 June 
2009 in 11 countries, which account for the bulk of these interventions: Australia, Canada, 
France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Spain, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and 
the United States. The discussion will be limited to central government and central bank 
actions that target bank balance sheets directly – assets, liabilities and shareholders’ equity – 
and will focus on three main categories of measures: recapitalisations, debt guarantees and 
asset purchase/insurance (see Appendix for a detailed description of these measures).  
1.  Recapitalisations: Governments shore up banks’ Tier 1 or Tier 2 capital by injecting 
resources in the form of common shares, preferred shares, warrants, subordinated debt, 
mandatory convertible notes or silent participations. In doing so, they improve banks’ 
                                                  
5   Other measures, such as central bank liquidity provision, have also helped to stabilise the financial sector. 
Direct interventions in selected credit markets have contributed to sustaining the flow of credit to firms and 
households in the light of weakened bank intermediation. These measures, however, are outside the scope of 
this chapter, but will be mentioned in Chapter 4. 
 
 
10capacity to absorb further losses and strengthen protection for banks’ creditors, contributing 
also to reducing the cost of financing on debt markets. Capital injections, by relieving balance 
sheet constraints, also seek to sustain banks’ capacity to lend. Depending on the terms, 
recapitalisations could dilute existing shareholders’ earning rights and depress stock prices.  
Recapitalisations via common shares also dilute voting rights.  
2. Debt guarantees: Governments provide explicit guarantees against default on bank debt 
and other non-deposit liabilities. These measures help banks maintain access to medium-
term funding at reasonable cost, offsetting the drying-up of alternative sources of funding 
(such as securitisation) and the increase in credit spreads. The intended effect is to reduce 
liquidity risk and lower overall borrowing costs. The potential adverse effects of this type of 
measure include segmentation and crowding-out of other credit markets and even distortions 
in the functioning of bond markets. 
3. Asset purchases or guarantees: Governments assume part or all of the risk of a portfolio 
of distressed or illiquid assets. Asset guarantees remove the “tail risk” of insured portfolios 
from banks’ balance sheets. Asset purchases improve bank liquidity, and may even provide 
capital relief, if purchase prices are higher than book values. The purchase of assets at 
prices below book value would instead imply a forced writedown for the recipient institution. 
A timeline of events 
Table 1.1 reports a timeline for the announcement of both system-wide support programmes 
and bank-specific standalone actions between September 2008 and 10 June 2009. Events 
so far can be divided into five distinct phases: 
Phase one (September 2008): standalone support actions for large institutions 
The earliest interventions were mostly support for single intermediaries. On 16 September, 
the day after the Lehman Brothers collapse, the first tranche of aid to AIG was accorded, 
whereby the US Treasury received a majority equity interest in the insurance firm. By late 
September, the authorities in Europe – where banks had until then been regarded as less 
vulnerable – also needed to take action. The Dutch and French governments took part in the 
recapitalisations of Fortis and Dexia, respectively, in concerted actions with the governments 
of Belgium and Luxembourg.  
Phase two (1–16 October 2008): comprehensive support packages 
As more and more financial institutions became affected by the crisis, it became apparent 
that ad hoc interventions to support individual institutions would not be sufficient to restore 
confidence in the system as a whole. Many countries announced comprehensive rescue 
packages involving some combination of recapitalisations, debt guarantees and asset 
purchases.
6 Nine out of the 11 countries under review announced a system-wide programme 
within the first half of October. Although Switzerland did not formally introduce any system-
wide programme, the authorities offered help to the country’s two biggest banks and 





                                                  
6   Increases in the deposit insurance limit were also widely adopted during this period. 
 
 










2  Currency 
Amount 
(billions)
3  DESCRIPTION 
16 Sep 2008  AIG  SAA CI USD  85  Emergency credit line to AIG from the NY Fed, in exchange for which 
the US Treasury gets a 79.9% equity interest. 
29 Sep 2008  Fortis  SAA  CI  EUR  4  The Dutch government purchases 49% of the Dutch activity of Fortis 
Group  (jointly with Belgium and Luxembourg). 
30 Sep 2008  Dexia  SAA CI EUR  3  The French government recapitalises Dexia, replacing top 
management positions (jointly with Belgium and Luxembourg). 
Fortis  SAA  CI  EUR  13  The Dutch government completes the nationalisation of the Dutch 
arm of Fortis Group. 
03 Oct 2008 
US  PRO  AP  USD  700  Emergency Economic Stabilization Act, containing a commitment for 
up to $700 billion to purchase bad assets from banks (TARP). 
06 Oct 2008  Hypo Real 
Estate  SAA DG EUR  50  First round of help for HRE. 
IT  PRO  CI  EUR  Unspecified  Italy approves a law granting the government the possibility to 
recapitalise distressed banks. 
PRO  CI  GBP            50 
08 Oct 2008 
GB 
PRO  DG  GBP         250 
The United Kingdom adopts a comprehensive rescue plan, including 
CI and DG measures. 
09 Oct 2008  NL  PRO CI EUR  20  The government announces that public funds can be used for bank 
recapitalisation, of which €20 billion immediately available. 
10 Oct 2008  CA  PRO  DG  CAD  Unspecified  The government announces a scheme to guarantee bank liabilities. 
12 Oct 2008  AU  PRO DG AUD  Unspecified  The government announces a scheme to guarantee bank liabilities. 
PRO  CI  EUR          40 
FR 
PRO  DG  EUR         265 
PRO  DG  EUR         400 
DE 
PRO  CI&AP  EUR      80 
IT  PRO  DG  EUR  Unspecified 
PRO  DG  EUR                100 
ES 
PRO  CI  EUR  Unspecified 
Over the weekend, euro area countries agree on a concerted action 
plan to preserve banking stability; as a follow-up national 
governments approve schemes including CI, DG and AP. 
13 Oct 2008 
US  PRO  CI  USD          250 
The government announces that up to $250 billion of TARP funds, 
originally earmarked to buy bad assets, will instead be used to 
recapitalise banks (Capital Purchase Program). 
NL  PRO DG EUR        200  Debt guarantee scheme approved. 
14 Oct 2008 
US  PRO DG USD      2,250  Debt guarantee scheme approved. 
AP  USD         54 
16 Oct 2008  UBS  SAA 
CI  CHF                    6 
The Swiss government recapitalises UBS and the SNB sets up a 
vehicle to remove up to $60 billion worth of illiquid assets from UBS’s 
balance sheet, on which the bank will bear the first $6 billion loss. 
05 Nov 2008  CH  PRO DG CHF  Unspecified  The government announces that it will - if needed - provide a 
guarantee on bank liabilities. 
AP  USD          47 
10 Nov 2008  AIG  SAA 
CI  USD             15 
Second round of help to AIG, including purchase of illiquid assets 
and capital injection via preferred shares (partly replacing the $85 
billion credit line). 
13 Nov 2008  Hypo Real 
Estate  SAA DG EUR               20   The government provides a guarantee on loans to HRE worth €20 
billion (partly replacing the first round of measures). 
AG  USD                262 
23 Nov 2008  Citigroup  SAA 
CI  USD                  20 
The Treasury subscribes $20 billion preferred shares and ring-fences 
troubled assets worth up to $306 billion (later reduced to $301 billion 
- on which Citigroup bears a first loss). 
28 Nov 2008  IT  PRO CI EUR  Unspecified   The government approves a law to inject capital into sound banks. 
17 Dec 2008  JP  PRO  CI  JPY  12000  A law is approved increasing the available funds for recapitalisation 
of banks from JPY 2 trillion to 12 trillion. 
AG USD                  97 
16 Jan 2009  Bank of 
America  SAA 
CI USD                  20 
The Treasury subscribes $20 billion of preferred shares and ring-
fences troubled assets worth up to $118 billion (on which BoA bears 
a first loss). 
19 Jan 2009  GB  PRO  AG  GBP  Unspecified 
A new plan is announced by the government, including the possibility 
for financial institutions to ring-fence selected portfolios of illiquid 
assets through a government backstop insurance. 
26 Jan 2009  ING  SAA AG EUR                  28 
The Dutch government provides a backup facility to cover the risks of 
the bank’s securitised mortgage portfolio worth €35.1billion (of which 
ING bears a 20% loss). 
03 Feb 2009  JP  PRO  AP  JPY  1000  Japan reintroduces a previously abandoned programme to purchase 
stocks from banks' balance sheets will resume. 
PRO CI USD  Unspecified 
10 Feb 2009  US 
PRO AP USD  Unspecified 
The Obama administration announces a new plan, including the 
Capital Assistance Program (stress tests and capital injections) and 
the Public-Private Investment Program (to remove legacy assets 
from banks' balance sheets; committed resources have been later 
quantified in $75-100 billion). 
02 Mar 2009  AIG  SAA  CI  USD  30 
Third round of help to AIG: the Treasury commits to a further $30 
billion equity line, converts part of earlier preferred stock investments 
into instruments more closely resembling equity and restructures 
parts of AIG activities. 
17 Mar 2009  JP  PRO CI  JPY             1,000  The Bank of Japan announces a framework for providing 
subordinated loans to banks. 
13 May 2009  DE  PRO  AG  EUR  200  Facility for banks to transfer toxic assets to a SPV, in exchange for 
government-guaranteed bonds. 
09 Jun 2009  US  PRO CI USD   –68  The US Treasury allows 10 big banks to pay back funds received 
under the Capital Purchase Program. 
1 SAA = standalone action; PRO = programme.   
2 CI = capital injection or emergency loan; DG = debt guarantee; AP = asset 
purchase; AG = asset guarantee.   
3 Indicates the size of government exposure for the various interventions.    




12The announcement of such a large number of comprehensive programmes was in part a 
result of international coordination, fostered both by the global scale of the crisis and by 
concerns over potential competitive distortions arising from uncoordinated measures. The G7 
meeting on 10 October established guidelines for assistance to systemically relevant 
institutions; as a follow-up, on 12 October euro area countries adopted an action plan which 
a few days later was extended to all EU countries and formed the basis for national plans.  
Phase three (November–December 2008): fewer programmes, more standalone actions 
The rollout of new programmes slowed down towards the end of the year, while 
implementation of existing ones gained pace: as private capital markets suffered heavily from 
the high uncertainty, government support for capital and debt issuance quickly became 
crucial to ensure bank financing. In early November, the Swiss authorities announced their 
readiness to provide guarantees on new bank debt – although no formal framework was set 
up. Later in the month, the Italian government approved a scheme to inject capital into listed 
banks. Notably, November saw the emergence of further problems for AIG and Citigroup, 
prompting further actions from the US authorities: both institutions received a combination of 
capital injection and asset purchase or guarantee.  
Phase four (January–April 2009): new packages with more emphasis on the assets side 
On 19 January 2009, the UK authorities announced new measures, which included an asset 
protection scheme, whereby the Treasury provided insurance against large credit losses in 
one or more defined asset portfolios. Two major banks had joined the scheme by the end-
March application deadline. On 10 February, the new US administration outlined the 
Financial Stability Plan, an articulated framework including a compulsory stress test for the 
19 biggest banks, a new capital injection programme (Capital Assistance Program – CAP) 
and a legacy asset purchase programme (Public-Private Investment Program – PPIP). Under 
the Plan, those institutions deemed in need of additional capital – and which could not raise 
capital from private markets – would obtain support from the CAP. The increased emphasis 
on legacy assets was reflected in standalone actions, which included an asset guarantee 
scheme (in combination with another capital injection) for Bank of America (on 16 January) 
and a backstop facility for a portfolio of mortgages held by ING (26 January).  
Phase five (May–10 June 2009): exiting for some, just getting started for others 
On 7 May, the main US regulators released the results of the stress test, which required 10 
institutions to raise a total of $74.6 billion in capital. In the meantime, in the light of the 
improved equity market conditions, a number of institutions were able to raise a substantial 
amount of equity from the market soon afterwards. On 9 June, 10 large banks were also 
allowed to repay funds previously received under the October scheme (Capital Purchase 
Program – CPP).
7 However, not all CPP recipients were prepared to repay in the near future 
and, indeed, capital injections continued. In Europe, capital injections through existing 
programmes or new standalone actions proceeded. At the time of writing, the Spanish 
government was considering the creation of a fund to facilitate the restructuring and 
consolidation of regional banks. In Germany, a “bad bank” draft law was passed in mid-May, 
creating the possibility for banks to swap their impaired assets for government guaranteed 
bonds.
8 The debt guarantee programmes in several countries were extended and/or 
expanded. 
 
                                                  
7   A number of smaller recipients had already started repaying from end-March 2009. 
8   The law was expected to gain parliamentary approval in July. 
 
 
131.2  Cross-country snapshot as of June 2009 
Adoption 
Table 1.2 provides a snapshot of the measures undertaken by each country with an 
indication of commitments and outlays. One immediate observation is that actions aimed at 
addressing capital shortages and funding difficulties (capital injections and debt guarantees) 
have been widespread: all countries in the sample have taken some measures of either type. 
Moreover, these types of interventions have mostly taken the form of system-wide 
programmes and have been implemented in the early phase of government intervention (see 
previous section). By contrast, measures for removing or guaranteeing banks’ assets have 
been adopted by fewer countries. In addition, in most of these cases the actions addressed 
problems at big systemic institutions rather than taking a systemic approach and were 
implemented at a later stage (see Box 1.1). This pattern has in part changed, however, as 
some recent initiatives in the United States and Germany have included comprehensive 
schemes for dealing with illiquid or impaired “legacy” assets. 
 
Box 1.1: Asset insurance of bank portfolios 
The United States, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom have provided asset insurance to a 
handful of banks (see table). Under these schemes, the government assumes a share of the 
potential losses on a portfolio of assets, usually after a first loss (or deductible) is absorbed by the 
bank. In return, the bank pays a fee or insurance premium based on the riskiness of the portfolio. 
While the bank continues to hold the assets, some or all of the associated “tail risk” is removed from 
the bank’s balance sheet. By limiting the bank’s potential losses, asset insurance reduces the 
regulatory capital it must hold. The government, however, is left with a large potential liability if the 
assets fall substantially in value. In all five cases, the asset insurance was accompanied by capital 
injection(s). All five beneficiaries made commitments to increase lending, limit compensation, and 
restrict dividends or share repurchases. 
  Citigroup  Bank of 
America 
ING RBS  Lloyds 
Banking 
Group  
Date announced  23 Nov 08  16 Jan 09  26 Jan 09  26 Feb 09  07 Mar 09 
Insured  portfolio  $301bn $118bn $35.1bn  £325bn £260bn 
Portfolio as % of trading assets, 
investment and loans  23.2% 8.4%  2.3%  14.8% 24.2% 




Bank’s first loss as % of portfolio  13.1%  8.5% None 6.0% 9.6% 
Bank’s subsequent share in loss  10% 10% 20% 10% 10% 
Government’s subsequent share 
in loss  90% 90% 80% 90% 90% 
Max downside for government  $228bn  $93bn  $28bn
2 £269bn  £196bn 
Reported increase in Tier 1 
capital ratio  1.5%  1.6%  0.4% 
Not 
disclosed 8.1% 
1 Includes £4.6 billion of deferred tax assets.    
2 Less any income and fees received.  
Sources: Company and government websites; author’s calculations. 
 
 
14Box 1.1: Asset insurance of bank portfolios (cont) 
The insured portfolios contain property loans and mortgage-backed securities, although other loans 
and securities have also been included. The size of the insured portfolio as a percentage of the 
bank’s trading assets, investments and loans varies from 2.3% for ING to 24.2% for Lloyds Banking 
Group. The average size of the insured portfolios of US and UK banks is 17.6%. The guarantee fee 
for the US insurance is between 2.4 and 3.4% of the insured portfolio, and is typically paid in 
preferred shares. The headline guarantee fee paid to the UK government ranges from 2.0% for 
RBS to 6.0% for Lloyds Banking Group. When the £4.6 billion of tax losses forfeited by RBS are 
taken into account, its fee is estimated to be between 4.0 and 6.0% of insured assets. The fee for 
ING has not been disclosed, but is reported to be 17.5% of the insured portfolio value.  
Asset insurance is analogous to a put option, sold by the government, on the portfolio with an out-
of-the-money strike price. The maximum upside for the government is the upfront fee it receives 
plus any agreed share of income. The maximum downside is the government’s share in the losses 
less the fee. Given that this fee has been typically paid in preferred shares, the value of the fee is 
affected by the future performance of the bank. In theory, the value of such a put option would 
depend on the market value and volatility of the portfolio, the time horizon of the insurance, and the 
level of interest rates. Given the hard-to-value nature of these portfolios, it is difficult to determine 
the option’s intrinsic value.  
This type of insurance raises the question of its cost to taxpayers and its effectiveness in supporting 
financial institutions. By providing insurance to selected banks, governments signal both the extent 
of the problems on the banks’ balance sheets and the systemic importance of the beneficiaries. On 
the positive side, asset insurance provides capital relief by reducing a bank’s risk-weighted assets, 
although the effect is hard to disentangle from the capital injections that accompanied them. Based 
on company reports, these schemes increased the Tier 1 capital ratios by 0.4% for ING, 1.5% for 
Citigroup, 1.6% for BoA and 8.1% for Lloyds Banking Group. However, since the insurance covers 
only part of the bank’s risky assets it does not eliminate uncertainly over future losses and cannot 
guarantee the restoration of investor confidence. 
Asset insurance has the advantage of not requiring any upfront outlay of public funds and may 
therefore be less politically difficult to implement. At the same time, the government’s contingent 
liability may be very large: compare, for instance, the potential maximum downside of the Citigroup 
scheme, at $228 billion, with the size of the US Capital Purchase Program, at $250 billion.  
The risk-return trade-off in the US and UK cases appears to favour the banks, as the government 
has assumed much of the downside (beyond the first loss), with limited or no share in the upside 




In Table 1.2, the outlay figures provide an indication of the magnitude of the actions 
undertaken so far.
9 Thus, the UK and the US interventions have been the largest relative to 
the size of the national banking sector (see Figure 1.1, left-hand panel). If outlays are scaled 
by the size of GDP, then the Netherlands appears to have taken massive action, while the 
United States appears to have done less. 
The commitment figures provide an indication of the overall exposure of governments vis-à-
vis the financial sector (Figure 1.1, right-hand panel).
10 The United Kingdom and the 
Netherlands stand out in terms of exposure, with overall commitments hovering around 50% 
                                                  
9   Outlays in the case of capital injections or asset purchases refer to the actual amount injected or purchased. 
In the case of debt and asset guarantee, outlays are defined as the government’s exposure given the actions 
actually taken. 




Snapshot of rescue packages 
In per cent 




of GDP, a figure that might raise concerns about the long-term sustainability of those 
commitments.
11 The high ratios are only partly a reflection of the relatively larger size of the 
banking sector in those two countries: even when scaled by total bank assets, commitments 
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1  No outlays so far.    
2  Excludes the unspecified verbal commitment of possible debt guarantee. 
Source:  Table 1.2 
12   The US banking sector is small relative to the size of the US economy. 
11  It is worth noting that, for the United Kingdom, around three quarters of overall commitment comes from the 
asset protection schemes for RBS and Lloyds Banking Group, for which the government’s potential exposure 
measures more than £400 billion. Excluding such exposure, commitments would fall to around 10% of GDP. 
Among banks that have received capital injections, the average amount of capital injected 
was close to 30% of the book value of shareholder equity. Among banks that have issued 
bonds under government guarantee, the average amount of bonds issued was small when 
compared with total liabilities, at 4.3%. Average intervention via asset purchase or guarantee 
amounted to 11.1% of total assets.  
Further insights into the provision of assistance to the financial system can be gained from 
bank-level information. Table 1.3 shows the participation figures for 85 financial institutions 
that have obtained government assistance. Around half of the sample (44) has received 
capital injections while three quarters (64) has issued guaranteed bonds; only 8 institutions 
have benefited from asset purchase or guarantees. Half of the banks that have received 
capital (22) have also issued guaranteed bonds, while all the banks participating in asset 






Table 1.2: Overview of commitments and outlays
1 
Euro billions and 
percentage points





























billions   % of GDP 





Australia Commitments – –– UNS UNS UNS – ––– –– UNS UNS UNS
Outlays – –– 62             10.4          4.6            – ––– –– 62                   10.4          4.6           
Canada Commitments – –– UNS U N S U N S–––––– UNS UNS UNS
Outlays – ––0 00– ––– –– -               -            -           
France Commitments 43             2.2            0.6            320         16.4          4.2            – ––5             0.2            0.1            368               18.9          4.8           
Outlays 28             1.4            0.4            72             3.7            0.9            – ––5               0.2            0.1            104               5.3            1.4           
Germany (2) Commitments 80             3.2            1.0            420           16.9          5.3            UNS UNS UNS 200           8.0            2.5            700                 28.1          8.9           
Outlays 22             0.9            0.3            129           5.2            1.6            0 000 00151               6.1            1.9           
Italy (3) Commitments 20             1.3            0.5            UNS UNS UNS – ––– –– UNS UNS UNS
Outlays 10             0.6            0.3            0 00– ––– –– 10                 0.6            0.3           
Japan Commitments 105           2.5            0.9            – ––8             0.2            0.1            – –– 113               2.7            0.9           
Outlays 3               0.1            0.0            – ––0               0.0            0.0            – –– 3                   0.1            0.0           
Netherlands Commitments 37             6.2            1.7            200         33.6          9.0            – –– 28           4.7            1.3            265               44.6          11.9         
Outlays 31             5.1            1.4            40             6.8            1.8            – –– 28             4.7            1.3            99                 16.6          4.4           
Spain Commitments UNS UNS UNS 100         9.1            3.0            – ––– –– UNS UNS UNS
Outlays 0 00 31             2.8            0.9            – ––– –– 31                 2.8            0.9           
Switzerland Commitments 4               1.1            0.2            UNS UNS UNS 27           7.6            1.3            – –– UNS UNS UNS
Outlays 4               1.1            0.2            0 00 27             7.6            1.3            – –– 31                 8.7            1.5           
United Kingdom Commitments 54             3.4            0.7            269         17.2          3.4            – –– 523         33.4          6.7            845               54.0          10.8         
Outlays 54             3.4            0.7            113           7.2            1.4            – –– 523           33.4          6.7            690               44.1          8.8           
United States (4) Commitments 335           3.0            3.4            1,760      15.7          18.0          115         1.0            1.2            281         2.5            2.9            2,491            22.3          25.5         
Outlays 237           2.1            2.4            271         2.4            2.8            36           0.3            0.4            281         2.5            2.9            825               7.4            8.4           
677           2.6            1.1            3,131      11.8          5.2            150         0.6            0.3            1,036      3.9            1.7            4,994             18.8          8.3           




Capital injections Debt guarantees (1) Asset purchase Asset guarantees (1)
 
1  As of 10 June 2009 unless otherwise specified. UNS = unspecified amount; “–” = no programme/action. Banking sector assets are consolidated data of: for Australia, banks, credit unions, building societies and corporations; 
for Canada, chartered banks; for Japan, depository corporations (banks and collectively managed trusts); for Switzerland, all domestic banks; for the five euro area countries and the United Kingdom, monetary financial 
institutions; and for the United States, commercial banks. (1) Outlays indicate the value of liabilities/assets actually under government guarantee. Debt guarantee outlays comprise only bonds publicly issued up to 29 May, 
except for: Australia, where they indicate average daily outstanding amounts of both deposits and wholesale funding in May 2009; and for the United States, where they include all outstanding FDIC-guaranteed liabilities as of 
31 May. (2) Part of the €80 billion set aside for recapitalisation can be used also for asset purchase. (3) The commitment for capital injection indicates the upper bound of the global budget for the measure as approved by the 
European Commission; outlays include the intended (publicly announced) requests for funds not yet finalised. (4) Figures exclude the capital injections to Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae and the $700 billion TARP commitment to 
buy illiquid assets (later modified for other purposes); capital injection outlays are net of funds already repaid by the time of writing. (5) Unspecified commitments are proxied by actual outlays.  
Sources: Bloomberg; company and government/central bank websites; press reports; authors’ calculations. 
  
Table 1.3 





book value of 
shareholder equity 
Guaranteed bonds 
issued / book value of 
liabilities 
Assets purchased or 
guaranteed / book 
value of total assets 
  CI DG  AP CI DG  AP CI DG  AP 
Average  (%)  29.0 29.1 58.1 2.5 4.3 3.7 11.1 13.6 11.1
Std. deviation (%)  33.0  18.2  61.7 2.0 7.9 2.8 15.8 17.8 15.8
Total amount (€ bn)  387  228  231 291 562 185 899  835  899
No of banks  44  22  8 22 64 6 8  6  8
CI = banks that have received capital injections; DG = banks that have issued guaranteed bonds; AP = banks 
that have participated in asset purchases or guarantees. 
1 Based on a sample of 85 financial institutions that have obtained government assistance; bank balance sheet 
data as of end-2008.   
2 Figures for capital injections do not take repayments into account. 
Sources: Bloomberg; company and government/central bank websites; press reports; authors’ calculations. 
 
It is of note that among those banks that have participated in asset purchase/guarantee, the 
average size of capital injection is much higher, at almost 60% of shareholder equity; 
moreover, as mentioned earlier, participation in asset purchase/guarantee usually occurred 
after earlier capital injections. This suggests that measures addressing illiquid asset 
portfolios were used only after a first phase of government support failed to fully restore 
confidence in troubled institutions. 
Figure 1.2 

































Capital injection as a percentage of book value of shareholders’ equity
Note: Based on a subsample of 21 financial institutions that have participated in both capital injections and debt
guarantees. Figures for capital injections do not take into account funds already repaid. 
1  As a percentage of book value of liabilities. 
Sources: Bloomberg; company and government/central bank websites; press reports; authors’ calculations. 
 
Finally, the banks that have received bigger capital injections also tend to be the ones that 
have borrowed more under government guarantees. Figure 1.2 shows a positive correlation 




Participation in programmes 
The uptake rate for eligible institutions is often mentioned as a possible measure of 
“effectiveness” of government rescue plans. In practice, however, this indicator is probably 
imperfect in many respects.  
The participation rate would be artificially high if the conditions of the programme (both price 
conditions and non-price conditions, such as limits to dividend distribution or caps on 
managers’ remuneration) were too favourable or if the programme were custom-designed to 
suit the needs of the intended beneficiary banks. Moreover, the participation rate could be 
higher in one country, irrespective of the characteristics of the programme, simply because 
domestic banks need government support more than banks in other countries. Yet another 
factor potentially affecting participation rates is the existence of stigma effects associated 
with participation. What also makes cross-country comparisons at any one point in time 
difficult is the fact that not all programmes have been in place for the same length of time: 
newer programmes are likely to show lower participation compared with programmes that 
have been in operation for a while. Finally, participation in debt guarantees might be partly 
driven by the maturity structure of liabilities. Unless these factors are taken into account, the 
uptake rate may not be a conclusive indicator of participation. 
In spite of these weaknesses, such an indicator is nonetheless interesting in that it provides a 
sense of how uptake varies across measures and across countries. Figure 1.3 shows the 
participation rate for the recapitalisation and debt guarantee schemes in the sample, defined 
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      No 
programme
1  Outlays under a programme as a percentage of the commitments of the programme.    
2  The top part of the bar 
denotes the amount that has since been repaid to the government.       
3  No  participation  so  far.    
4  Simple 
average of countries with programme and defined participation. The top part of the bar in the left-hand panel 
denotes the amount that has since been repaid by US banks to the government.    
5  There is participation, but 
total commitment is not specified. 
Sources: Bloomberg; company and government/central bank websites; press reports; authors’ calculations. 
 
                                                  
13   For programmes with an unspecified maximum committed amount – if no outlays have taken place, the 
participation rate is defined as being equal to zero (eg recapitalisation programme in Spain; debt guarantee 
programmes in Canada and Italy). For programmes that do not have a maximum limit but for which outlays 




The average uptake on capital injections (49%) is higher than that for debt guarantees 
(18%). A small number of fully developed programmes have seen zero participation so far 
(eg debt guarantee in Canada and Italy). This probably reflects the fact that financial 
intermediaries in those countries are in good enough shape to not need assistance.
14  
The United Kingdom is the country with the highest participation rates for both capital 
injections and debt guarantees. This possibly reflects the tailor-made nature of the 
programmes, the design of which involved the participation of the nation’s major financial 
institutions. The high participation rate in the US recapitalisation programme,
15 around 80% 
(gross of the $70 billion already paid back by a number of institutions), could instead reflect 
the favourable price terms at which the government offered public injections. 
For debt guarantees, the flat fee scheme implemented in the United States – more 
favourable, in principle, for riskier banks than the European schemes, where fees vary with 
banks’ riskiness – was not sufficient to induce a higher participation rate: indeed the US 
uptake ratio (15% as of end-May 2009) is lower than the average one for the European 
countries included in the sample (24%).  
Finally, the participation rate, so defined here, might also be interpreted as an indicator of the 
residual room for government to provide support to banks within the approved frameworks. In 
this sense, countries with an already high participation rate have less room for manoeuvre in 
case there is need to provide yet more help to some financial institutions. These countries 
may face the risk of having to find additional resources, which might put additional stress on 
public finances and encounter political opposition.  
1.3  Bank financing before and after the introduction of government support  
As mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, government intervention became crucial 
during the crisis as traditional sources of funding for financial institutions shrank significantly. 
The sharp deterioration in market conditions and investor confidence after the collapse of 
Lehman Brothers in September 2008 made it extremely difficult for banks to continue 
financing their activities through debt and equity markets; at the same time, M&As in the 
banking sector, which could have provided a private sector solution to bank restructuring, 
remained subdued compared to preceding years. This section reviews how banks’ sources 
of financing evolved before and after the introduction of government support measures. In 
particular, it examines trends in quarterly public issuance of bonds, convertible securities, 
preferred shares and common equity in domestic and global capital markets over the past 
two years.
16 The role of M&As in facilitating bank restructuring in the crisis is instead the 
focus of Box 1.2.  
Bank financing through public capital markets 
Prior to the crisis, US and European banks relied extensively on public debt markets to raise 
longer-term capital (Figure 1.4). Debt issuance made up the majority of public market 
financing in 2007 and 2008. Common share issuance was a distant second choice, with little 
issuance of preferred shares or convertible securities. Following the Lehman bankruptcy, 
                                                  
14  Alternative – non-exclusive – explanations could be stigma effects or that the terms of the programmes are 
unattractive even for institutions that may be in need. 
15   This refers to the Capital Purchase Program only. 
16  Data are based on public market issuance by private-sector banks and finance companies, as reported by 
Dealogic. The analysis does not consider internal sources of financing, deposits or money market activity, 




global bond issuance fell by half from a peak in the second quarter of 2008 to the third 
quarter, falling further in the fourth. Secondary market trading activity also came to a 
standstill, with credit spreads on senior and unsecured bank debt widening dramatically. With 
interbank and money markets virtually closed, banks that relied on wholesale markets for 
funding found themselves with no means to finance their increasingly illiquid portfolios.  
Figure 1.4 
Capital market financing for private banks and finance companies
1 
In billions of US dollars 
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1    Includes covered bonds but excludes issuance of asset-backed securities (ABS) and mortgage-backed 




In this environment, issuance of government-guaranteed debt ballooned relative to non-
guaranteed bond issuance (banks’ issues of guaranteed bonds are examined in detail in 
Chapter 3). US and UK banks were the largest issuers in the first quarter of 2009. Although 
Australian banks were relatively unaffected by the crisis, they took advantage of this cheap 
form of capital and issued significant amounts of guaranteed debt in the first quarter of the 
year. German and Spanish banks were also active issuers.  
Government capital injections represented a second major source of bank capital raising 
over this period. Most governments bought hybrid securities – such as preferred shares, 
subordinated debt or mandatory convertible notes – with only the UK government purchasing 
common shares in its banks. The US capital injections under the Capital Purchase Program 
were by far the largest, and show up as a large spike in preferred share issuance in the 
fourth quarter of 2008 and first quarter of 2009 (Figure 1.4). Over this six-month period, the 




capital raised by those institutions. Other countries investing significant amounts of capital 
were the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, France and Germany.    
The negative trend in capital markets somewhat reversed in the second quarter of 2009, 
reflecting growing confidence that the worse of the crisis had passed. Issuance volumes of 
non-guaranteed debt rose, as these markets recovered. Over the same period, government-
guaranteed issuance fell from its peak in the previous quarter. Overall, in the second quarter 
the share of non-government-guaranteed bonds and common stock in global capital raising 
rose while the share of government-guaranteed debt and preferred issuance declined. 
In the United States, the increased private appetite for risk followed the release in early May 
of the results of the US government’s stress tests for the 19 largest bank holding companies. 
US regulators directed 10 of the banks examined to increase their level of capital or to 
improve the quality by including more common shares. A number of banks took advantage of 
the reduced uncertainty and the increased risk appetite of investors to raise common equity 
and issue debt. The pattern in the United Kingdom was similar, with a rise in issuance of 
common stock and non-guaranteed bonds. Japanese financial institutions issued large 
amounts of common equity, while French, German, Italian and Swiss banks relied mostly on 
non-guaranteed debt issuance. In Australia, activity in the second quarter of 2009 was lower 




Box 1.2: Bank mergers and acquisitions – an alternative solution? 
In the midst of the crisis, merger and acquisition (M&A) activity could have represented a private 
sector solution to strengthen weaker banks, via consolidation with stronger ones. However, during 
the period under review, the scope of the operations concerned was substantially reduced, 
suggesting that this type of solution was not very actively applied. 
M&A activity in the banking sector had been buoyant until the third quarter of 2007, but began to 
contract with the onset of the financial market turmoil in late 2007, well before the outbreak of the 
full-blown crisis in 2008. The number of bank M&A deals worldwide (ie where the target company is 
a bank) dropped from an average of 121 per quarter in the two years to Q3 2007 to about 90 in the 
subsequent quarters, even if the spike in Q4 2008 is taken into account (graph, left-hand panel). 
Notwithstanding some high-profile deals during this turbulent period,
1 the number of M&As in 2008 
and Q1 2009 was low by the standards of the last decade, matched only by that in 2002 in a period 
characterised by weak economic conditions and corporate scandals. There was also a considerable 
decline in the number of deals involving investment companies, which include investment banks.  
M&A deals in the banking sector
1 







2000 2002 2004 2006 2008
0
50






The horizontal dashed line indicates the simple average for Q1 2000–Q4 2008.    
1  M&As involving majority interests, where the target company is a bank; the banking sector includes commercial banks, bank 
holding companies, savings and loans, mutual savings banks and credit institutions. Data for Q1  2009 are 
provisional.    
2  Both the target company and the acquirer are banks of the same country.    
Source: Based on Thomson Reuters SDC Platinum data. 
Past experience shows that the deals aimed at restructuring weak banks are generally realised 
through domestic intra-industry deals,
2 where banks are taken over by other banks of the same 
country. This option tends to be both operationally and politically more viable. Even though deals in 
this category have continued to represent the majority of the bank M&A deals worldwide, their 
number has also decreased since late 2007 (graph, right-hand panel). In fact, domestic intra-
industry M&A activity in 2008 and Q1 2009 was at its lowest level in at least 15 years. 
A number of factors may have hampered the appetite for M&As in general or the use thereof as a 
solution for rescuing weak banks in particular. First, the crisis has most severely affected large 
intermediaries, which would be expensive as targets for potential bidders. In turn, large financial 
intermediaries are themselves not in a strong position to acquire smaller competitors – the trend 
has in fact been divestment rather than further acquisitions. Second, even if there have been willing 
bidders, the illiquidity of international stock and bond markets has made it extremely difficult, 
including for very large intermediaries, to raise the resources necessary to finance the deals. Third, 
M&As, in particular those involving large banks operating in retail markets, may have given rise to 
concerns about the potential anti-competitive effects of the transactions. M&As may also have been 
limited by political resistance to the surrender of control of large domestic banks to foreign 
investors, as epitomised by the debate on the role of sovereign funds as suppliers of capital. 
_____________________ 
1 For example, Bank of America acquiring Countrywide Financial and Merrill Lynch, Wells Fargo acquiring 
Wachovia, Lloyds TSB acquiring HBOS, and BNP Paribas acquiring 75% of Fortis Bank from the Belgian 
state. 





Details of government support measures 
As discussed in Section 1.2, recapitalisation and debt guarantee programmes have been 
widely adopted since the outbreak of the financial crisis in September 2008; at a later stage, 
some countries also adopted actions targeting banks’ portfolios of legacy assets. This 
appendix reviews the main features of government measures between September 2008 and 
10 June 2009 in 11 countries, which account for the bulk of these interventions: Australia, 
Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Spain, Switzerland, the United 
Kingdom and the United States. Table A1 provides a summary of the different types of 
measures covered in the analysis.  
 
Table A1: Overview of government support measures 
As of early June 2009 
  Recapitalisation  Debt guarantee  Asset purchase  Asset guarantee 
  PRO  SAA PRO SAA  PRO  SAA  PRO SAA 
Australia                  
Canada                  
France                      
Germany                      
Italy                    
Japan                    
Netherlands                     
Spain                   
Switzerland       
1            
United Kingdom                    
United States                           
PRO = programme; SAA = standalone action;   = measures announced and in use;   = measures 
announced but not yet in use;   = concerted action with other government(s). 
1 Verbal commitment only, no formal programme adopted. 
 
Recapitalisation programmes 
Table A2 provides an overview of the main features of capital injection schemes. Eight of the 
11 economies in the sample have adopted programmes, though not all of them have been in 
use (eg the first Italian programme aimed at distressed banks or the Spanish programme). 
As of June 2009, the second US programme (Capital Assistance Program – CAP) had yet to 
inject any capital, though a preliminary stress test phase has been completed; those banks 
deemed in need of additional capital that will not be able to raise it from private sources will 
obtain support under this scheme.  
Funds are typically administered by the Ministry of the Economy/Finance. In Japan, the 
Financial Services Agency and the Bank of Japan are each responsible for one programme. 
In Germany and France, instead, funds are issued via two new entities: the Sonderfonds 





The maximum size of programmes is typically well defined. The notable exceptions are Italy 
and Spain, where there is no explicit maximum amount – though the authorities made it clear 
that resources would be provided “as needed”. The US CAP does not have a specified size 
in part because the amount to be provided will depend on how much capital banks have 
been able to raise on their own after the stress test. There are a few programmes where a 
per-institution limit applies. For example, for the second Italian programme and the first US 
programme (Capital Purchase Program – CPP), the limit is a fraction of the bank’s risk-
weighted assets. In Germany, the cap is described as “in general” €10 billion.  
The eligible institutions are mainly banks and credit institutions, though some programmes 
also admit insurance companies (eg in France, Germany and the Netherlands) and other 
financial institutions such as pension funds (in Germany). A number of programmes allow 
access by subsidiaries of foreign banks as well. 
A wide range of instruments is represented; however, most capital injections tend to take 
non-dilutive forms such as preferred shares, non-voting securities, mandatory convertible 
instruments or subordinated debt securities. The purchase of common shares is dominant 
only in the UK programme, though it is also used in selected actions under other 
programmes (eg the second injection into Commerzbank) as well as in standalone actions 
(see below). But there are options for converting/exchanging instruments with less loss-
absorption capacity to/for common shares (or instruments closer to common shares).
17 
The  pricing of instruments can be quite complicated and differs considerably across 
countries. The ECB has established guidelines for programmes in Europe: the annual cost of 
hybrid capital instruments must reflect market considerations and must be between 6 and 
9.3%, according to the degree of subordination. Nonetheless, individual countries have room 
to put in place complex pricing structures that provide incentives that (i) favour early 
repayment, so as to reduce taxpayers’ exposure, and (ii) avoid excessive recourse to the 
programme, but without being excessively penalising.
18 In the UK scheme, ordinary shares 
have been issued at a discount to the reference market price, while preferred shares pay a 
rather hefty 12% annual dividend for the first five years and three-month Libor plus 700 basis 
points thereafter. By contrast, the cost of preferred shares under the US CPP is a relatively 
generous 5% for the first five years and a flat 9% thereafter. Pricing is dearer under the CAP, 
where the mandatory convertible instrument carries a 9% annual dividend. 
A number of non-price conditions also apply, with restrictions on executive compensation 
and dividend payments among the most widely adopted. Requirements to maintain adequate 
lending to businesses and/or households are also widespread. Some schemes give the 
government the right to appoint board members or to oversee corporate governance of the 
recipient. Finally, capital injection could also be made conditional on the adoption of an 
appropriate business strategy or restructuring plan (eg Germany, the first Italian scheme). 
                                                  
17   In the French programme, for example, banks were given the option to replace the subordinated debt issued 
in the first round of capital injection with preferred shares in the second round. In the UK programme, the small 
amount of preferred shares issued in the first round of injection were later replaced with ordinary shares. 
18   In the French scheme, for example, the dividends of preferred shares are the higher of the cost of 
subordinated debt plus 25 basis points and distributed profits augmented by a factor (105% in 2010, 125% in 
2018), with a cap at twice the cost of subordinated debt. In the Dutch case, the non-voting shares issued so 
far pay nothing if no dividends were paid in the previous year, 8.5% per year if dividends of up to 8.5% were 
distributed, or else amounts equal dividends augmented by a coefficient (110% in the first year, 120% second 
year, 125% thereafter). In the second Italian scheme, the cost of the undated convertible subordinated debt is 
the highest of three options: (i) a flat rate starting at 8.5% and increasing over time; (ii) distributed dividends 
augmented by a coefficient, starting at 105% and increasing over time; or (iii) starting in 2011–12, 30-year 





Finally, a number of programmes have redemption and conversion options. In Italy and the 
Netherlands, preferred shares can be converted to ordinary shares after three years, while 
buybacks are allowed but at a premium over the issue price. In the United States, preferred 
shares under the CPP can be redeemed by the banks after three years, at the issue price 
augmented by accrued and unpaid dividends. Early redemption is allowed only with the 
proceeds from the sale of Tier 1 qualifying perpetual preferred stocks or common stocks. 
Recapitalisation: standalone actions 
Four countries in the sample have undertaken capital injections outside system-wide 
programmes to support financial institutions that were under more severe strains. In 
Switzerland, UBS received a CHF 6 billion injection in the context of a legacy asset purchase 
operation (see below). The injection took the form of mandatory convertible notes with a 
12.5% coupon. The notes would convert into common shares after 30 months, giving the 
government an approximate 9% stake in the bank. The recipient was subject to limits to 
compensation policies and on-site inspections by the central bank. 
France participated in a concerted intervention with Belgium and Luxembourg to support 
Dexia. The French state and the state-controlled financial services company Caisse des 
Dépôts et Consignations subscribed to €3 billion out of the total €6.4 billion equity capital 
injection. The chairman and the CEO of the recipient were replaced by two government 
nominees.  
The Netherlands intervened, also with Belgium and Luxembourg, in Fortis, a Benelux 
insurance-banking group. The first concerted intervention in late September 2008 sought to 
take a 49% stake in the respective national activities of the banking arm of the group via an 
injection of €11.2 billion in common equity (of which €4 billion came from the Netherlands). 
While Belgium’s and Luxembourg’s announced injection went ahead, the Dutch state later 
replaced the capital injection with the outright purchase of all of Fortis’s Dutch operations 
(both banking and insurance) for €16.8 billion. The Belgian state also subsequently bought 
the remaining stake in the Belgian banking operation (Fortis Bank) from the group.
19  
In the United States, standalone actions have been taken in favour of AIG, Citigroup and 
Bank of America.
20 AIG has seen three rounds of interventions. On 16 September 2008, the 
day after the Lehman bankruptcy, the company was granted an $85 billion 24-month credit 
facility from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. In return, the US government received a 
79.9% equity interest with the right to veto the payment of dividends to shareholders. The 
second intervention in November 2008 included a $40 billion investment by the Treasury in 
new preferred shares
21 and two asset purchases (see below). In return, the original credit 
facility was reduced to $60 billion, but with more favourable terms.
22 In the third intervention 
in March 2009, the $40 billion preferred shares issued in November were converted to new 
preferred shares that more closely resemble common shares, a new equity capital facility of 
up to $30 billion was introduced, and the amounts owed to the credit facility were reduced, in 
exchange for government stakes in two AIG-related special purpose vehicles (SPVs). 
                                                  
19   After this purchase, the Fortis group was left with only insurance operations. The Belgian state later 
transferred 75% of Fortis Bank to BNP Paribas.  
20   In addition to the government-sponsored agencies Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in early September 2008. 
21   The so-called Systemically Significant Failing Institutions category under TARP. 
22  Interest on the credit drawn was reduced from a punitive three-month Libor plus 850 basis points to three-
month Libor plus 300 basis points. The fee on the undrawn portion of the facility was reduced from 850 to 75 




After receiving $25 billion each under the CPP, both Citigroup and Bank of America 
received another $20 billion capital injection in November 2008 and January 2009, 
respectively.
23 These injections involved Treasury subscriptions of preferred shares with a 
fixed coupon of 8% (higher than that for CPP shares in the first five years), a prohibition of 
dividend payments for three years and limits on executive compensation. The two additional 
injections were announced in the context of multi-element packages that included asset 
guarantee plans for the two banks (see below). 
Debt guarantee programmes 
Table A3 provides an overview of debt guarantee schemes announced since September 
2008. Of the 11 countries in the sample, only Japan and Switzerland have not formally 
adopted any new debt guarantee scheme, though the Swiss authorities did make a verbal 
commitment to provide guarantees in case of need. France and Germany have both 
programmes and standalone actions. 
The size of programmes is usually predetermined, except for those in Australia, Canada and 
Italy. Most schemes impose a per-institution limit on how much each participant can issue 
under guarantee. The limit tends to be based on either the outstanding amount of debt set to 
mature by a certain date or some measure of the participating institution’s liabilities; in the 
Canadian and US schemes, the limit is set at 125% of the maturing debt. Other conditions 
such as minimum issue size may apply (eg in Canada and Spain). 
All schemes include domestic banks as eligible institutions. Most schemes potentially also 
cover subsidiaries of foreign banks.
24 Some also cover institutions such as building societies, 
thrifts and credit unions. The German programme is the only one that explicitly covers 
insurance companies, pension funds and other financial entities as well.
25 The French 
scheme is a special case in that guarantees are not extended directly to financial institutions 
but to a new, partly government-owned entity (Société de Financement de l’Economie 
Française – SFEF). The funds raised by SFEF are then lent against eligible collateral to 
French credit institutions and subsidiaries of foreign credit institutions. 
As for eligible instruments, the focus is on newly issued senior unsecured debt. Some 
schemes explicitly require that the instrument be non-complex (eg in Australia, Canada, the 
Netherlands and the United Kingdom) or marketable (eg in Canada and Spain). A number of 
schemes also cover shorter-term instruments such as certificates of deposit and commercial 
paper. Interbank borrowings are covered in some cases (eg in Australia, Germany and the 
United States). Over time, a few countries have extended guarantees to other instruments 
such as asset-backed securities (the United Kingdom) and mandatory convertible bonds (the 
United States). In terms of maturity, the focus is on medium-term instruments, with some 
schemes explicitly excluding very short-term liabilities. The maximum maturity, if stated, is 
typically either three or five years.
26 With regard to currency denomination, most 
programmes allow issuance in foreign currencies at least to some extent.  
Most EU countries have adopted similar market-determined fees consisting of a fixed base 
fee (typically 50 basis points per annum) plus, for issues over one year, an add-on that 
                                                  
23   The so-called Targeted Investment Program under TARP. 
24   Branches of foreign banks are covered in the Australian and US programmes, but are subject to restrictions in 
participation (eg only in transaction account guarantee but not debt guarantee). 
25   The US scheme also admits US holding companies controlling at least one insured institution. 
26  Several programmes that started out with a maximum maturity of three years subsequently extended the 




equals the issuer’s median credit default swap (CDS) spreads over some historical period.
27 
Individual countries, however, may impose caps on the CDS spread add-on (eg Italy and the 
Netherlands) or other surcharges (eg Germany for the unused part of granted guarantees, 
and Italy for issuance with maturity longer than two years).
28 Outside Europe, in Australia 
and Canada the tiered fee schedules are based on issuers’ credit ratings.
29 A notable 
exception is the United States, where the fee varies only by maturity, without regard to the 
issuer’s credit r
30 ating.  
                                                
With the exception of the US scheme, all others are opt-in frameworks, requiring eligible 
institutions to apply for guarantees by a certain deadline. The issuance window varies. For 
the EU schemes in the sample, the window closes at the end of December 2009. The 
issuance windows of the two North American schemes were set to close relatively early 
when the schemes were first launched, but were later extended. In Australia, the application 
deadline and issue-by date are not specified and will depend on market conditions. Most 
programmes’ guarantee coverage expires when the guaranteed instrument matures. Taking 
the issuance deadline and maximum maturity as a reference, coverage would expire at end-
December 2014 at the latest in most cases. Coverage for the two schemes with no maximum 
limit on the maturity for eligible instruments is either set to end on a fixed date (United States) 
or capped at a fixed time period after issuance (three years for Canada), even if some 
guaranteed instruments have yet to mature.
31  
Debt guarantee: standalone actions 
There are only two standalone actions in debt guarantees: one for Dexia (France, in concert 
with Belgium and Luxembourg) and one for Hypo Real Estate (Germany). Unlike the 
programme guarantees, which are meant for sound financial institutions, these two 
standalone actions are aimed at supporting more troubled institutions.  
The guarantee for Dexia SA and some of its subsidiaries and their overseas branches has 
some features that are similar to those of programme guarantees in Europe. It guarantees up 
to €150 billion of senior unsecured non-complex debt, including money market 
transactions.
32 Eligible instruments are not restricted in terms of minimum maturity, but must 
mature by 31 October 2011, when the coverage will end. The issuance period ends on 31 
October 2009, somewhat earlier than for most programmes. The fee is also based on a base 
fee and a CDS spread add-on, but includes an additional category for short-dated 
 
27   For issuers with no CDS, the add-on can be calculated based on the CDS of institutions similar by ratings or 
other characteristics. 
28  In the special case of France, banks borrowing from SFEF need to provide collateral and are charged fees 
and interest reflecting normal market rates. According to market reports, borrowers pay the equivalent of their 
median five-year CDS spread from 1 January 2007 to 31 August 2008 plus a standard fee of 20 basis points. 
In addition, interest charges depend on SFEF’s own refinancing costs. 
29   In Canada, a surcharge applies for foreign currency denominated issuances. 
30   There is an add-on for holding companies. A new surcharge also applies under the extended issuance period 
announced in February 2009. 
31   After the extension and expansion of the US scheme, the guarantee on debt issued prior to 1 April 2009 will 
still expire no later than 30 June 2012. The guarantee on new debt issued after 1 April 2009 will expire on the 
earliest of 31 December 2012, the stated maturity date, or the mandatory conversion date for mandatory 
convertible debt. For the Canadian scheme, the guarantee expires on 31 December 2012 at the latest, given 
the new issue-by date and the three-year coverage cap. 
32   France guarantees up to 36.5% of the total (€54.75 billion), Belgium up to 60.5% (€90.75 billion) and 




instruments (less than one month) at a more preferential 25 basis points per annum. Dexia 
can opt out on some issues. 
The guarantees provided by the German authorities to Hypo Real Estate (HRE) outside the 
national scheme (which is run by SoFFin) are more complex and are designed specifically for 
securing credit from a private consortium of banks and the Deutsche Bundesbank. They 
include a state guarantee of €20 billion and a SoFFin-guaranteed HRE note of €15 billion 
eligible for Eurosystem refinancing, both with maturity at end-March 2009 (later extended to 
end-December 2009). The two guarantees supplement a secured HRE note (€15 billion) 
subordinated by a German financing consortium in exchange for HRE collaterals (€60 billion) 
that were not eligible for Eurosystem refinancing.
33  
Asset purchases  
In contrast to recapitalisation and debt guarantee, the purchase of legacy assets has not 
been widely adopted. Table A4 provides an overview of the few legacy asset purchase 
programmes and standalone actions in the sample.
34  
Although the US Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) was the first legacy asset purchase 
plan to be announced (on 3 October 2008), it has subsequently been used more as a 
recapitalisation fund. A true US asset purchase programme did not emerge until the 
announcement of the Public-Private Investment Program (PPIP) in February 2009 (see 
below). 
Germany’s  SoFFin has a risk assumption facility that allows for the purchase of up to 
€5 billion of assets from each eligible institution. This facility taps the same €80 billion fund 
as SoFFin’s recapitalisation facility (see above). The sellers of assets are subject to non-
price conditions such as limits on dividend payments and remuneration. However, no assets 
seem to have been acquired by this facility. Instead, in May 2009 a draft law was passed to 
prepare the establishment of a new facility for credit institutions to swap their legacy assets 
(mainly structured instruments and their derivatives and hedges) for SoFFin-guaranteed 
bonds (expected amount up to €200 billion). The setup as outlined in the draft law suggests 
that this is more a guarantee rather than a purchase facility. 
The first purchase actually implemented was the acquisition of assets from UBS by a Swiss 
National Bank (SNB) facility, an SPV called SNB StabFund. The SNB provides 90% of 
financing in the form of a secured long-term loan. UBS provides 10% capital and takes first 
loss. The SPV pays interest to the SNB on the loan. After full repayment of the loan, the SNB 
participates in profits generated by the SPV with $1 billion up front and with 50% of 
eventually remaining equity value. The purchase targets mainly US real estate related assets 
but also includes some other securities. The final total amount of assets transferred was 
$38.7 billion, lower than the original maximum ($60 billion), after both parties had agreed not 
to transfer some assets. Some non-price conditions apply. 
In the United States, the first instance of asset purchase was from AIG via two Federal 
Reserve-financed limited liability companies (LLCs), Maiden Lane II and III. The former is for 
purchasing up to $22.5 billion of residential MBS (RMBS) from AIG’s securities lending 
collateral portfolio. The latter is for purchasing up to $30 billion of collateralised debt 
obligations (CDOs) on which AIG Financial Products had written CDS contracts. The Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY) provides financing to the LLCs with a six-year loan, 
                                                  
33   This package replaced, in November 2008, an earlier credit facility also partially secured by government 
guarantees. 
34  More countries have engaged in asset purchases from selected credit markets in order to support market-




while AIG provides $6 billion in subordinated loans as capital to cover the first loss. The LLCs 
pay interest to the FRBNY on the loans. AIG can share in residual cash flows after the loans 
are repaid. $20.8 billion of RMBS were bought in December 2008; the first tranche of CDOs 
($20.1 billion) was bought in November. 
The PPIP, announced on 10 February 2009, sets out to do what the original TARP intended: 
to free banks’ balance sheets from the burden of legacy assets. The programme has two 
components: the Legacy Loan Program (LLP) and the Legacy Securities Program (LSP). 
Purchases are to be financed 50-50 by private and public capital (the US Treasury plans to 
use about $75–100 billion of TARP funds) as well as possible additional leverage provided or 
guaranteed by the authorities. In the LLP, pools of loans would be auctioned off to the 
highest bidding investor. In the LSP, a number of fund managers are authorised to invest in 
legacy securities.
35 As of June 2009, the LSP was awaiting the announcement of the list of 
eligible fund managers. There seems to be no firm implementation date yet for the LLP. 
Somewhat different in scope is the Bank of Japan’s offer to purchase up to ¥1 trillion of 
stocks held by financial institutions. This offer, announced on 3 February 2009, is a 
reintroduction of a previous stock purchase programme used from November 2002 to 
September 2004. Although this is not really a purchase of “toxic” assets in the Swiss or US 
sense of the term, it serves a similar purpose, ie to reduce financial institutions’ exposure to 
market risk, thereby promoting financial stability. Between 23 February and end-June, the 
central bank purchased some ¥25.7 billion of stocks offered by banks. 
Asset guarantees
36  
Table A4 also outlines the main features of the few asset guarantees extended by the 
authorities in four countries. In all instances, the guarantees are highly customised for the 
beneficiary institution, even for the ones done under the UK programme framework.  
In a package that included a $20 billion capital injection announced in November 2008 (see 
above), the US Treasury and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) provided 
protection to Citigroup against large losses on $301 billion in real estate and other illiquid 
assets. Citigroup pays a fee to the government in the form of $7 billion of preferred shares. It 
bears the first $29 billion of losses. The government shares 90% of subsequent losses 
(capped at $15 billion). Any residual risk is backstopped by the Federal Reserve (at 90%) 
with a non-recourse loan (although interest payment at the overnight index swap rate plus 
300 basis points per annum is with recourse). The insurance lasts for 10 years for real estate 
assets and five years for the rest. Citigroup is subject to compliance with an asset 
management template, restrictions on dividends to common shareholders, oversight of 
corporate governance and restrictions on executive compensation. In January 2009, a similar 
package was offered to Bank of America (BoA). The insurance element covers a $118 
billion portfolio of real estate assets and derivatives that BoA had acquired from Merrill 
Lynch. BoA bears the first $10 billion of losses and pays a fee in the form of $4 billion of 
preferred shares and warrants. The length of coverage, the funding terms, the loss-sharing 
arrangement and other conditions are similar to those for Citigroup.  
The UK Asset Protection Scheme (APS) was introduced in January 2009 as part of a 
second package of support measures.
37 Only two banks joined the scheme (the application 
                                                  
 
35  The LSP has the potential to link up with a prospective Legacy TALF (the original TALF accepts only top-
graded ABS backed by consumer credit). 
36   See also Box 1.1 in the main text for a discussion of the pros and cons of asset guarantees. 
37  Under the APS, banks bear the first losses. The Treasury shares 90% of subsequent gains/losses. Eligible 






                                                                                                                                                     
 
In November 2008, France extended a guarantee with Belgium to cover a $16.98 billion 
asset portfolio of Financial Security Assurance (FSA), a US monoline insurer and a 
subsidiary of Dexia SA. Dexia bears the first loss of $4.5 billion. France shares 37.6% of 
subsequent losses, while Belgium covers the rest. This joint action was effected in 
connection with the agreed purchase of FSA by Assured Guaranty from Dexia. 
A different setup is used in the Netherlands, where an illiquid assets backup facility was 
created in January 2009 to transfer to the state 80% of the risk from a $35.1 billion portfolio 
of Alt-A mortgage securities at ING Direct USA and ING Insurance Americas. There is no 
first loss. The Dutch state and ING simply share the exposure 80-20. ING pays a premium 
and receives management and funding fees in return. Details of the premium and fees are 
not explicitly spelt out but are expressed in net present value terms. ING has agreed to grant 
€25 billion in credit to individuals and companies, suspend bonuses for its board of directors 
and abide by the corporate governance measures detailed in an earlier capital injection.  
deadline has now expired). In return for insuring £325 billion of assets, RBS pays a fee of 
£6.5 billion in non-voting but dividend-paying B shares and gives up existing UK tax credits 
plus any new tax credits arising from future losses. It bears the first £19.5 billion of losses 
and commits to extend new lending of £25 billion in 2009. Lloyds Banking Group also 
joined the scheme to insure £260 billion of assets. It pays a fee of £15.6 billion to be used by 
the Treasury to buy the banking group’s B shares. It bears a first loss of £25 billion and 
promises to increase lending for the 12-month period ending 1 March 2010 by £14 billion and 
by another £14 billion for the 12-month period thereafter. 
credit assets held by participants as at 31 December 2008 and thereafter. The covered asset pool, the first 
loss and fees are determined on a case by case basis. Participants are subject to lending, asset management, 
reporting and disclosure requirements, as well as compliance with executive remuneration policy. Coverage is 








Table A2: Recapitalisation programmes – main features as of early June 2009 
Country




2  Pricing of instruments  Conditions
3 
FR (SPPE)  13 Oct 08  €40bn  PREF, SUB, and COM 
for troubled banks 
SUB: fixed rate for first five years, variable rate thereafter. 
PREF: the higher of SUB cost + 25 bp and distributed 
dividends augmented by a coefficient 
COMP, LEND, 
OTH 
DE (SoFFin)  13 Oct 08  €80bn  Any means appropriate  Market-compatible compensation, preferential to participation 
rights of the existing proprietors 
COMP, DIV, LEND, 
OTH 
IT – 1 (MEF)  08 Oct 08  –  PREF    DIV, OTH 
IT – 2 (MEF)  28 Nov 08  –  PERPSUB  The highest of three options, with fees increasing over time  COMP, DIV, LEND 
JP (FSA)  17 Dec 08  ¥12trn  PREF     
JP (BoJ)  17 Mar 09  ¥1trn  SUB, PERPSUB  Minimum spreads will be set by central bank at each auction   
NL (MEF)  09 Oct 08  €20bn  Any means appropriate  Non-voting securities: 8.5% coupon, paid only if dividends 
are awarded in preceding year. If dividends exceed coupon, 
coupon will equal dividend augmented by a coefficient (110% 
first year, 120% second year, 125% thereafter) 
COMP, BOARD 





08 Oct 08  £50bn  COM, PREF  First round: COM: 8.5% discount to the closing price on 10 
October 08. PREF: 12% annual dividend for five years, three-
month sterling Libor + 700 bp thereafter 
COMP, DIV, LEND, 
BOARD 
US – CPP 
(Treasury) 
13 Oct 08  $250bn  PREF, WARR  PREF: 5% annual dividend for five years, 9% thereafter  COMP, DIV, OTH 
US – CAP 
(Treasury) 
10 Feb 09  –  MCP (converts after 
seven years), WARR 
MCP: 9% annual dividend, paid quarterly. Conversion: 90% 
of average closing price for the common stock for the 20-
trading day period ending 9 February 09 
COMP, DIV, LEND, 
OTH 
1 Administrators in parentheses: BoJ = Bank of Japan; FSA = Financial Services Agency; MEF = Ministry of the Economy/Finance; SoFFin = Sonderfonds 
Finanzmarktstabilisierung; SPPE = Société de Prise de Participation de l’Etat. 
2 COM = common/ordinary shares; MCP = mandatory convertible preferred shares; PERSUB = 
undated/perpetual subordinated debt/loan; PREF = preferred shares; SUB = subordinated debt; WARR = warrants.  
3 BOARD = board appointment; COMP = executive 
compensation; DIV = dividend; LEND = lending commitments; OTH = others.  






Table A3: Debt guarantee programmes – main features as of early June 2009 
Eligible instruments 










amount  Fee 
AU   12 Oct 08  –  –  DB, FB  All major  max 5 yrs  –  Varies with credit rating (3 tiers): 70, 100, 150 bp 
CA  10 Oct 08  31 Dec 09  up to 3 yrs 
after issue 
DB, FB  DC, FC  min 3 mths  –
1  110 bp + (if no required rating) 25 bp + (if foreign 
currency) 20 bp 
FR  13 Oct 08  31 Dec 09  31 Dec 14  SFEF
2  DC, FC  max 5 yrs  €265bn  Base cost + borrowing bank’s risk level
3 
DE  13 Oct 08  31 Dec 09  31 Dec 14  DB, FB, O  DC, FC  max 5 yrs  €400bn  % of borrowing amount + risk premium 
IT  13 Oct 08  31 Dec 09  31 Dec 14  DB, FB  DC  3 mths to 5 yrs  –
1  50 bp + (if > 1 yr) median 5-yr CDS spread Jan 
07–Aug 08 + (if > 2 yrs) 50 bp 
NL  14 Oct 08  31 Dec 09  31 Dec 14  DB, FB  DC, FC  3 mths to 5 yrs  €200bn  50 bp + (if > 1 yr) historical CDS spread 
ES  13 Oct 08  15 Dec 09  15 Dec 12  DB, FB  DC, FC  3 mths to 3 
yrs
4 
€100bn  Historical CDS spreads 
GB  08 Oct 08  31 Dec 09  09 Apr 14
5  DB, FB  DC, FC  max 3 yrs  £250bn  50 bp + median 5-yr CDS spread Jul 07–Jul 08 
US  14 Oct 08  31 Oct 09  31 Dec 12
6  DB, FB  DC, FC  > 30 days  $2,250bn
1  Varies with maturity (3 tiers): 50, 75, 100 bp; 
10 bp add-on for bank holding company; new 
surcharge
7 
† Dates in italics are inferred from the issue-by date and the maximum maturity of eligible instruments. “–” = not specified; DB = domestic banks/credit institutions; FB = 
subsidiaries/branches of foreign banks; O = others (eg insurance companies, pension funds, money market funds); DC = domestic currency; FC = foreign currency. 
1 With known per-institution limit. 
2 Guarantee applies to issuance by SFEF (Société de Financement de l’Economie Française), which in turn lends funds to credit institutions 
against collateral. 
 3 Cost for banks borrowing from SFEF.  
4 Extendable to five years under exceptional circumstances.  
5 Up to one third of guaranteed debt can be rolled 
over until this date. All guaranteed debt can be rolled over until 13 April 2012.  
6 Latest guarantee expiration date for debt issued after 1 April 2009 (the extended issuance 
period). For debt issued prior to 1 April 2009, the guarantee still expires no later than 30 June 2012.  
7 For debt (of at least one year) issued between 1 April and 30 June 
2009 and maturing by 30 June 2012: 10 bp for insured depository institutions, 20 bp for others. For debt issued between 30 June and 31 October 2009, or debt issued after 1 
April 2009 with maturity beyond 30 June 2012: 25 bp for insured depository institutions, 50 bp for others.   
Sources: Central bank, government and company websites; press reports. 





Table A4: Asset purchase and guarantee – main features as of early June 2009 
Beneficiary’s share in loss
  First 
announced  Beneficiary Asset  type 
Purchase/ 
insured 
amount  First Subsequent 
Fee/cost 
FR
§  14 Nov 08  Dexia/FSA  –  $16.98bn
1 $4.5bn  –  – 
DE: SoFFin  13 Oct 08  Banks, others  Wide range 
§ indicates guarantee. “–” = specified. 
1 An asset portfolio of FSA, a subsidiary of Dexia. France covers 37.6% of losses after first loss, Belgium covers the rest.  
2 €5 billion 
per-institution limit.  
3 And their derivatives and hedges held as of 31 December 2008. Mainly ABS, CDO, CLO, RMBS and CMBS. 
4 Reintroduction of a previous programme.  
5 ¥250 billion per-bank limit.  
6 Can share in 50% of profits after repayment of loan, interest and fee due to the SNB.  
7 In dividend-paying B shares.  
8 Can share in residual 
cash flow (up to a limit) after repayment of loan and interest due to the Federal Reserve.  
9 In preferred shares.   
max €80bn
2      
DE: new facility
§  13 May 09  Banks, others  Structured secs
3  max €200bn      In line with market 
JP: stock purchase  03 Feb 09
4 Banks  Stocks  max  ¥1trn
5      
NL: backup facility
§  26 Jan 09  ING  Alt-A mortgages  $35.1bn  None  20%  Not explicit 
CH: SNB StabFund  16 Oct 08  UBS  Real estate related $38.7bn  10% capital 
6  SNB loan: 1-m Libor + 250 bp; 
fee: $1bn 
GB: APS
§  19 Jan 09  Banks, others  Wide range –  Varies  10%  Varies 
– under which 26 Feb 09  RBS    £325bn  £19.5bn  10%  £6.5bn
7 + tax credit 
  07 Mar 09  Lloyds Banking 
Group 
 £260bn  £25bn  10%  £15.6bn
7 
US: Maiden Lane II  10 Nov 08  AIG  RMBS  max $22.5bn  $1bn 
8 




§  23 Nov 08  Citigroup  Real estate related $301bn  $29bn  10%  $7bn
9 
US
§  16 Jan 09  Bank of America Real estate related max $118bn  $10bn  10%  $4 bn
9 
US: PPIP  10 Feb 09  Banks  Real estate related 
securities & loans 
about $500bn       
Sources: Central bank, government and company websites; press reports. 
Fed loan: 1-m Libor 
+ 100 bp 
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2.  Effect of the government rescue measures on banks
38 
This chapter examines the impact of government rescue measures on bank risk and 
valuation by looking at the effects on banks’ CDS premia and stock prices in 10 industrialised 
countries.
39 
Overall, government interventions have been effective in reducing banks’ default risk as 
measured by CDS premia. On average, the announcement of system-wide rescue packages 
was followed by a fall in CDS premia, especially for announcements of capital injections. 
Bank CDS premia have shown a further reduction when the government measures were 
actually implemented, under both comprehensive rescue programmes and standalone 
initiatives. The reduction in CDS premia was also larger in countries where governments 
deployed more resources. We find positive spillover effects across countries, as in some 
cases CDS premia showed “early declines” after the announcements of packages by other 
countries.  
The positive reaction of bank CDS premia to government interventions is consistent with our 
priors on the effects of such measures. Capital injections improve banks’ capacity to absorb 
losses, thus strengthening creditors’ protection. Guarantees on liabilities improve banks’ 
funding liquidity, thus reducing the likelihood of financing shortfalls and bankruptcies. Finally, 
asset purchases or guarantees transfer part or all of the riskiness of banks’ assets to 
governments, thus reducing the likelihood of future bank losses.  
Unlike CDS spreads, stock prices did not show a positive reaction to government rescue 
measures. Although in some countries bank equities rose immediately after the 
announcements, in all cases prices eventually fell substantially below their pre-
announcement levels. This might reflect several factors. First, capital injections at low prices 
substantially dilute shareholders’ earning rights. In some cases, governments intervened by 
subscribing common stock, thus also diluting shareholders’ voting rights. Second, concerns 
about national governments becoming important stakeholders might have negatively affected 
investors’ perception of banks’ long-run profitability, thus contributing to the depression of 
market prices. Finally, in the first phase of the interventions the lack of a credible exit strategy 
for governments might have increased uncertainty, thus raising the risk premium on banks’ 
equities. 
Overall, our analysis suggests that rescue packages have contributed to reducing banks’ 
probability of default, to the benefit of creditors and CDS protection sellers. This result has 
been achieved in part through the redistribution of resources from shareholders to creditors, 
which is reflected in the opposite reactions of banks’ CDS premia and stock prices: while the 
former reverted to more normal levels after the interventions, the latter hardly recouped any 
losses. 
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 2.1 examines the impact of 
government interventions on bank CDS premia, analysing both market-wide and bank-
specific evidence and emphasising differences between developments in the United States 
and Europe. Section 2.2 examines the response of stock prices.  
                                                  
38   The analysis in this chapter includes government measures up to 9 April 2009, unless otherwise specified. 




2.1  Impact on CDS premia 
The analysis focuses on the measures undertaken between September 2008 and the 
beginning of April 2009. We divide government interventions into three main categories: (i) 
capital injections (CI); (ii)  debt guarantees (DG); and (iii) asset purchases and asset 
guarantees (APG). We first assess the market-wide impact of comprehensive rescue 
programmes, analysing the correlation between country-specific indices of bank CDS premia 
and the announcement of governments’ commitment to support the banking sector. We then 
study how the actual deployment of government resources affected the CDS premia of 
individual institutions. Finally, we identify the main events that affected CDS premia since 
Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy and analyse cross-country differences in the reactions to these 
events.  
2.1.1 Market-level  analysis 
In this section, we consider only the announcements of packages with sector-wide scope 
(that is, government commitments to support the entire financial/banking sector, excluding 
measures targeting specific institutions). For each country, we compute an index of bank 
CDS premia (the simple average of the five-year CDS premia of all domestic banks 
considered), shown in Figure 2.1.
40 In most countries, CDS premia reached a peak at the 
end of September, reflecting the rise in uncertainty following the default by Lehman Brothers. 
By contrast, CDS spreads declined sharply in the first half of October (shaded area in the 
figure), following the adoption of systemic packages in most countries (see Section 1.1 in 
Chapter 1). From then on, premia remained quite steady in all countries except the United 
States until the beginning of 2009. In the first half of January, however, CDS started climbing 
again and peaked around mid-March in most countries, to then gradually return to levels 
closer to the pre-Lehman phase.  
Figure 2.1 
Bank CDS premia 

























Notes: The shaded area denotes the period of coordinated interventions (Oct 1 – 16), country indices are 
obtained as simple averages of the five-year CDS premia of a sample of large banks (see Annex Table 1). 
Sources: Bloomberg; authors’ calculations. 
                                                  
40  Annex Table 1 reports the list of the 41 large international banks included in the study. We base our main 
discussion on bank CDS premia, without controlling for “general market conditions”, as represented by some 
benchmark CDS index. This choice makes the presentation simpler and more straightforward, and it does not 
affect our main conclusions (all our main results are unchanged if we consider the behaviour of bank CDS 
premia relative to a non-bank benchmark). 
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A comparable pattern was observed in bank senior unsecured bond spreads, which are an 
alternative indicator of market perception of the riskiness of financial institutions (see Box 
2.1). 
The interventions generated spillover effects across countries: in the euro area, CDS premia 
began to decline as early as 3–8 October, when the US and UK plans were announced but 
before the announcement of the European plans. Similarly, the European announcement, on 
12 October, coincided with a further reduction of the differential in the United Kingdom and 
the United States.  
In order to examine the impact of the interventions, we conduct an event study. For each 
announcement date (denoted t*), we examine the behaviour of our CDS index over a 50-day 
window including 25 trading days before and after t*.
41 We allow for more than one “event” 
for each country: for example, if two different programmes are announced on different days 
in the same country, we include both in the event study. 
Figure 2.2 
Changes in bank CDS premia: market-level analysis by type of measure
1 










Asset purchases and guarantees
1    Cumulative change in CDS premia before and after government interventions. The symbol t* denotes the
announcement day. Results are reported separately for capital injections, debt guarantees and asset purchases
and guarantees. 
Sources: Bloomberg; company and government/central bank websites; press reports; authors’ calculations. 
 
The results, shown in Figure 2.2, suggest that the packages had a strong impact on bank 
CDS premia.
42 If all programmes are considered, the announcements reduced the level of 
CDS premia by about 20 basis points in the three days surrounding the announcement (ie 
from t*–1 to t*+1) and by 30 basis points from t*–5 to t*+1 (the fact that the reduction starts 
before t* suggests that markets anticipated the interventions before the announcement). 
                                                  
41  In an event-study, results depend on the choice of the event date and the length of the time window. For 
example, investors could have anticipated the content of the rescue measures (and acted accordingly) before 
the official announcement. Our choice of defining t* as the date on which government measures are publicly 
announced seems nonetheless well suited to analyse market response via CDS premia and stock prices. A 
list of the events included in this and all other analyses in this chapter is available from the authors upon 
request. 
42   As is usual with event studies, which suffer from a number of well-known limitations, results have to be 
interpreted with caution. First, it is unclear what the correct counterfactual experiment would be (i.e. what 
would have happened to CDS spreads in the absence of the interventions). Second, if markets expected 
packages of a given size or scope, the reaction to the announcement would likely be affected by those priors. 
Third, by focusing on bank CDS premia, we do not consider the potential positive effects of the support 
measures on the overall economy (at least insofar as they help to avoid a sharp reduction in the supply of 
bank credit, which could have had a severe impact on the real economy). 
38 
  
From day t*+5, CDS premia stabilise and eventually drift upwards again, offsetting part of the 
previous improvement.  
The average performance just described conceals different patterns for different types of 
measures. The reduction of spreads is more pronounced for DG (about 40 basis points from  
t*–1 to t*+1 and 55 basis points from t*–5 to t*+1) and CI (about 30 and 40 basis points in the 
two time windows, respectively). In contrast, the announcement of asset purchase/insurance 
schemes does not seem to influence CDS spreads. 
The results for individual countries indicate that the announcements of the measures had a 
positive short-run impact (reducing CDS spreads) in all markets except Switzerland 
(Figure 2.3), although over a longer time span (25 days) the effect is reabsorbed in both Italy 
and the United Kingdom. 
Figure 2.3 
Changes in bank CDS premia: market-level analysis by country
1 





















1  Cumulative change in CDS premia after government interventions. The symbol t* denotes the day on which 
government interventions are announced. 
Sources: Bloomberg; company and government/central bank websites; press reports; authors’ calculations. 
 
Box 2.1 
Secondary spreads on unsecured bank debt  
Figure A shows developments in bank bond spreads for six countries from September 2008 to the 
end of June 2009. These spreads, expressed in basis points, are relative to an underlying 
government benchmark bond with a similar maturity. The figures show the average secondary 
market spread for benchmark senior unsecured bonds and subordinated bonds, based on fixed 
rate, bullet issues with an average maturity between three and five years. For completeness, 
government-guaranteed bond spreads are also shown as a benchmark to highlight bank risk 
relative to other factors (see Chapter 3 for a deeper analysis of guaranteed bond spreads and other 
characteristics). 
Following the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in mid-September, credit spreads widened 
dramatically in all countries except Germany, reflecting increased risk aversion, reduced liquidity in 
secondary markets and greater volatility across a range of asset markets. The announcement of 
bank rescue packages in mid-October did allow bank bond spreads to stabilise or to narrow in 
several countries. In the United States, for example, the average spread on senior or subordinated 
debt narrowed by over 300 basis points, albeit from very distressed levels. In other countries such 
as Germany, however, bank bond spreads remained at stubbornly high levels or continued to 
widen. In early 2009, bank spreads widened again as the initial optimism about the outlook for the 
macroeconomy was dashed by a series of negative revisions to GDP growth rates across a range 
of advanced and emerging economies. Market participants again grew sceptical about the financial 




Secondary spreads on unsecured bank debt (cont) 
Figure A 
Bank debt spreads over government benchmarks 
Unweighted average of the banks indicated, in basis points 
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 Sources: Bloomberg; BIS calculations.   
After peaking in March 2009 in most countries, spreads later recovered steadily up to the end of 
June: by mid-2009, spreads on senior unsecured debt in most countries and on subordinated debt 
in the United States and Switzerland had recovered to their pre-Lehman levels. Spreads on 
subordinated debt in the United Kingdom, Germany, France and the Netherlands also narrowed but 
remained at elevated levels. The fall in spreads was probably driven by a return of risk appetite, 
reflected in rising stock markets and falling volatility, as well as the reduced uncertainty about 
banks’ financial health following stress tests in many countries. However, despite these positive 
developments, the significant premium between government guaranteed bank debt and unsecured 
bank debt remained, particularly in the United States, the United Kingdom, France and the 
Netherlands. 
Some banks took advantage of the dramatic decline in prices to repurchase subordinated debt 
below par in the secondary market. These repurchases served two purposes. First, to the extent 
that the debt is retired and not refinanced, these actions reduced the banks’ leverage. Second, the 
purchases increased the banks’ capital because the difference between the book value of the debt 
and the market price at which it is repurchased can be booked as a capital gain, increasing bank 
profits and retained earnings. 
 
Our next step is to examine whether the size of the measures announced also matters. In 
principle, one would expect the decline in bank CDS premia to be proportional to the amount 
of resources made available by governments. To examine this issue, in Table 2.1 we 
40 
  
correlate the change in CDS premia over a horizon of one, five and 15 days with the amount 
of resources pledged for capital injections and debt guarantees in a given country.
43  
The results indicate that the size of the interventions matters: for both CI and DG, the 
correlation coefficients are generally negative, suggesting that larger programmes are 
associated with bigger reductions in CDS premia.
44 The correlations are larger when we 
normalise recapitalisations by aggregate assets or loans and debt guarantees by aggregate 
wholesale liabilities. This is not surprising: the first ratio (the resources pledged for CI as a 
percentage of assets or loans) is a proxy for the reduction in bank leverage, while the 
amount of DG scaled by wholesale liabilities is a proxy for the reduction in refinancing risk.  
 
Table 2.1 
Correlation between the size of the measures and the change  
in bank CDS premia: market-level analysis  
Correlation between t*–1 and t*+1, t*+5, t*+15 
Measures scaled by:  Time window 
(no of days) 
Total bank loans  Total wholesale 
bank liabilities  Total bank assets  Total bank capital 
 
Capital injections (eight observations) 
1   –0.70*  –0.67* –0.61 –0.45 
5 –0.57  –0.80*  –0.49  –0.34 
15 –0.54  –0.63*  –0.51 –0.26 
 
Debt guarantees (six observations) 
1 –0.73 –0.52    –0.85*  –0.15 
5 –0.42 –0.65 –0.51   0.05 
15 –0.60   –0.74* –0.65  –0.19 
The table reports correlations between the size of measures and the change in market-level bank CDS spreads 
between t*–1 and t*+1, t*+5, t*+15 (* denotes significance at 10%). The symbol t* denotes the day on which 
government interventions are announced. The size of the measures is normalised using market-specific 
variables.  
Sources: Bloomberg; company and government/central bank websites; press reports; authors’ calculations. 
 
In order to shed further light on the nature of these correlations, we regress the change in 
CDS premia (over the three different horizons) on the amount of resources pledged, 
including all three types of measures (that is, CI, DG and APG) and scaling interventions by 
both bank assets and total loans.
45 We include one dummy for each type of measure, in 
order to examine the effectiveness of the measures. The results, shown in Table 2.2, confirm 
                                                  
43  We normalise the size of the measures by GDP and by four different measures of the overall size of the 
banking system in each country. We do not examine asset purchase/insurance measures, as we have only 
two observations.  
44  A weak correlation emerges when the size of the measures is normalised by GDP, reflecting cross-country 
heterogeneities in the size of the banking sector relative to the real economy. 
45   A potential endogeneity problem arises with this simple specification, as the amount of resources deployed by 
each government is presumably commensurate with the severity of the banking sector problems at hand. 
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that the size of the programmes did have an impact on the reduction in CDS spreads: 
coefficients are generally negative and significant, in spite of the very small number of 
observations. Among the different measures, CI seem to be more effective than DG and 
APG: the dummy for CI is negative and very significant (while the dummies for DG and APG 
are statistically not different from zero). From an economic point of view, our estimates 
suggest that the announcement of a capital injection of 1 percentage point of total bank 
assets would reduce CDS premia by around 30 basis points after 15 working days.  
 
Table 2.2 
Market-level analysis: regression results 
  Dependent variable 
(p–values in parentheses) 
  ΔCDSt*+1  ΔCDSt*+5  ΔCDSt*+15  ΔCDSt*+1  ΔCDSt*+5  ΔCDSt*+15 
Amounts:        
 –3.9
* –3.5 –3.1      
 
as a % of total 
banking sector assets 
(0.06) (0.33) (0.18)    
     –3.7
*    –2.0 –2.6
*
 
as a % of total 
banking sector loans      (0.14) (0.09) (0.07)







  (0.01) (0.06) (0.00) (0.02) (0.10) (0.01)
Dummy DG  –22.9  –27.7 –23.9 –13.6 16.1  2.1
  (0.20) (0.38) (0.24) (0.60) (0.70) (0.93)
Dummy APG  1.7  –35.4 22.6 1.5 36.7  23.3
  (0.92) (0.29) (0.29) (0.93) (0.23) (0.25)
R
2  0.76 0.55 0.71 0.73 0.62 0.75
Adjusted R
2  0.69 0.40 0.61 0.64 0.49 0.66
No of observations  16  16 16 16 16  16
The dependent variable is the cumulative change in CDS premia after government interventions, in basis 
points. The symbol t* denotes the day on which government interventions are announced. The dummies 
indicate different types of measures: CI (capital injections), DG (debt guarantees) and APG (asset purchases 
and guarantees).  
Sources: Bloomberg; company and government/central bank websites; press reports; authors’ calculations. 
 
2.1.2 Bank-level  analysis
46 
The preceding subsection examined how the announcements of market-wide measures 
affected the perceived riskiness of the overall banking sector. Here, we examine how CDS 
premia of individual banks were affected by the announcement that specific banks would 
                                                  





47 As in the previous aggregate analysis, we report the results of 
an event study, a correlation analysis and a simple regression analysis.
48 
Two differences emerge from the bank-level event study relative to the market-level analysis. 
First, the positive impact of CI measures may have been more pronounced than previously 
estimated: after a capital injection, the average CDS spread decreases by more than 60 
basis points, and remains roughly constant thereafter (see Figure 2.4).
49 Second, measures 
targeting banks’ assets (APG) now contribute to lowering CDS premia from their peaks, 
although the effect is weaker than that of CI measures (recall that these measures were not 
effective at the market level).  
Figure 2.4 
Changes in bank CDS premia: bank-level analysis by type of measure
1 









t*–25 t*–20 t*–15 t*–10 t*–5 t*–1 t*+1 t*+5 t*+10 t*+15 t*+20 t*+25
Capital injections (CI)
Memo item: market level CI
Asset purchases and guarantees (APG)
Memo item: market level APG
1    Cumulative change in CDS premia before and after government interventions. The symbol t* denotes the
announcement day. Results are reported separately for capital injections, debt guarantees and asset purchases
and guarantees. 
Sources: Bloomberg; company and government/central bank websites; press reports; authors’ calculations. 
 
We then conduct a bank-level correlation analysis, in order to assess whether banks 
receiving greater support have also experienced a larger reduction in their CDS spreads.
50 
The results, reported in Table 2.3, confirm the negative correlation between the amount of 
capital injections and the reduction in CDS premia. In contrast, APG display a positive 
correlation, especially in the very short run. This counterintuitive result could reflect the fact 
that these actions were directed at the most troubled institutions, so that markets might have 
interpreted the announcement of government intervention as a negative signal on the state of 
                                                  
47   For example, in the case of a bank participating in a national recapitalisation scheme, the announcement date 
(t*) will refer to the day on which it was publicly announced that the specific institution would receive capital 
assistance under that programme, regardless of the announcement date for the programme.  
48   Only banks for which CDS data were publicly available are included in the sample (see Annex Table 1). We 
do not include DG schemes in the event study, as banks participating in those schemes usually issued many 
bonds at very close intervals, making it very difficult to identify the effects of each issue. 
49  As a robustness check, we repeat the event study for CI excluding the measures implemented around mid-
October, when most comprehensive plans were also implemented, so as to control for the potential 
confounding effects that might arise from the overlap between systemic and bank-specific measures. The 
results (unreported) confirm the fall in banks’ CDS premia from their peaks, although the effect is less 
pronounced than that reported in Figure 2.4. 
50  The resources received by each bank are normalised using bank-specific variables such as stock market 
capitalisation and balance-sheet items. 
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health of the banks involved; however, it is worth noting that the number of observations 
used in the calculations is extremely small. 
Table 2.3 
Correlation between the size of the measures and the change  
in bank CDS premia: bank-level analysis  
Interventions scaled by:  Time window 
(no of days)  Shareholder 
equity 
Market 
capitalisation  Total assets  Total loans 
 
Capital injections (27 observations) 
1 –0.15 –0.25  –0.42*  –0.25 
5 –0.19    –0.36*  –0.53*  –0.18 
15 –0.16    –0.36*  –0.50* –0.25 
 
Asset purchases/guarantees (six observations) 
1   0.33    0.91*    0.84*   0.92* 
5  –0.16  0.29 0.22 0.44 
15  –0.21  0.07 0.06 0.24 
The table reports the correlations between the size of the support granted to individual banks and the change 
in the bank’s CDS spread between t*–1 and t*+1, t*+5, t*+15. The symbol t* refers to the day on which 
government interventions are announced. The size of the measures is normalised using bank-specific 
variables.  
Sources: Bloomberg; company and government/central bank websites; press reports; authors’ calculations. 
 
Regression analysis corroborates the view that the reduction of the CDS spreads depends 
on the amount of the resources pledged by the government, especially over the longer 
horizons.
51 As in previous cases, capital injections seem to be more effective. In particular, 
similarly to the market-level analysis of the previous section, our findings suggest that a 
capital injection equal to 1 percentage point of the bank’s assets reduces the CDS spread by 
about 30 basis points. The coefficients of the other two types of measures (DG and APG) are 
smaller and often not significant.
52  
                                                  
51  A potential endogeneity problem arises, as the size of the interventions is likely correlated to the severity of 
the problems experienced by a given institution. 
52   The coefficients on the DG dummy are weakly significant over the t*+5 and t*+15 horizons. However, results 
over horizons longer than one day are difficult to interpret. In fact, most banks participating in DG programmes 
issued several government-guaranteed bonds in the period examined. Thus, the DG “events” considered have 
a significant degree of overlap. As a robustness check, we rerun our regressions excluding DG measures. 




Bank-level analysis: regression results 
  Dependent variable 
(p–values in parentheses) 
  ΔCDSt*+1  ΔCDSt*+5  ΔCDSt*+15  ΔCDSt*+1  ΔCDSt*+5  ΔCDSt*+15 
Amounts:        
 –1.0 –8.0
*** –7.3
***    
 
as a % of balance-
sheet assets 
(0.40) (0.00) (0.00)    
     –2.6
***    –0.5 –2.9
***
 
as a % of balance-
sheet loans      (0.24) (0.00) (0.00)







  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)





  (0.26) (0.07) (0.09) (0.24) (0.08) (0.07)
Dummy APG  –19.6
** 8.5 5.6 –18.1
** 4.7 8.6
  (0.03) (0.50) (0.77) (0.04) (0.70) (0.64)
R
2 0.19 0.17 0.09 0.19 0.17  0.10
Adjusted R
2 0.18 0.16 0.08 0.19 0.16  0.09
No of observations  382 382 382 382 382  382
The dependent variable is the cumulative change in CDS premia after government interventions, in basis 
points. The symbol t* denotes the day on which government interventions are announced. The dummies 
indicate different types of measures: CI (capital injections), DG (debt guarantees) and APG (asset purchases 
and guarantees).  
Sources: Bloomberg; company and government/central bank websites; press reports; authors’ calculations. 
 
2.1.3 Country-level  analysis   
This subsection briefly examines the movements in bank CDS spreads in the United States 
and the main European markets around key events related to the interventions or to 
important developments in the financial crisis.  
While we find evidence of spillover effects, whereby the measures taken in one country 
benefited banks in other countries as well, we also find that the CDS premia of US banks 
behaved differently from those of European banks between mid-October and the beginning 
of January: after most national packages were announced CDS premia stabilised in Europe, 
while they remained volatile in the United States in response to new problems and more 
government interventions. Since January, developments in CDS premia have become similar 
in all countries, with premia resuming their upward trend, amid deteriorating economic 
conditions and more problems at major banks. Nonetheless, the new measures announced 
by the US government since January seem to have provided some relief. In mid-March, a 
reduction in banks’ CDS premia began, sustained by a flow of positive news that hinted at an 
improvement in the profitability of banks and a progressive stabilisation of financial markets.  
45 
  
(a) United  States 
In Figure 2.5, we report an index of CDS spreads for US banks, together with an index of 
bank stock prices.
53 In Table 2.5, we also report the changes in the CDS premia of the US 
banks included in our index over the period from June 2008 to March 2009, dividing the 
entire period into a number of subperiods defined by key events. Overall, the most 
pronounced swings in the dynamics of US CDS premia were registered in response to these 
key events. 
Figure 2.5 
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Stock index (29 Sep 2008 = 100, rhs)
Sources: Bloomberg; Datastream; authors’ calculations. 
 
The rise in CDS premia that began in May–June 2008 culminated on 18 September, shortly 
after the Lehman bankruptcy (15 September) and the rescue of AIG (16  September). 
Immediately after the press conference held by the US government on 19 September, at 
which a draft law for the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) was unveiled, CDS premia 
sharply contracted. After 23 September, however, CDS premia increased again, reflecting 
the difficulties encountered in converting the rescue packages into legislation and market 
concerns over how effective the measures would be in restoring the soundness of US banks. 
This upward trend continued until 14 October, when the government substantially revamped 
its rescue plan, pledging part of the TARP money to recapitalise banks. Following this 
decision, the CDS premia of the major US banks experienced a new sharp reduction. 
Starting on 21 October, the US financial system was hit by a number of critical events 
emanating from key (systemic) individual domestic financial institutions and from developing 
countries. CDS premia started to rise again, in spite of the intervention by the US authorities. 
After the turn of the year, CDS premia were pushed upwards by renewed concerns about the 
depth and duration of the recession and about its impact on banks’ balance sheets. 
Additional interventions by the US authorities provided only temporary relief. The rise in the 
CDS premia of US banks appeared to come to an end only at the beginning of March, after 
Citigroup announced its return to profitability in the first part of 2009 and communicated that 
it expected to remain profitable throughout the year. Other banks made similar 
announcements, while yet others expressed the intention of returning government funds as 
soon as possible. 
 
                                                  
53  The CDS index is a simple average of the five-year CDS premia for six big US banks (see Annex Table 1). 




Timeline of events and changes in the CDS premia of US banks  
Time window  Event 



































































01 Jun 08  18 Sep 08 15 Sep  Lehman files for bankruptcy  144 24 120  119  226  98 133
    16 Sep  First rescue package for AIG       
18 Sep 08  23 Sep 08 19 Sep  First press conference about US TARP  –78 –8 –70  –56  –148  –40 –66
23 Sep 08  30 Sep 08   TARP legislation encounters political 
opposition     
    29 Sep  Bailout bill defeated in US House of 
Representatives 
Citigroup to acquire banking operations 
of Wachovia  40 3 37  13  115  9 21
30 Sep 08  13 Oct 08  03 Oct  TARP is finally approved  28 40 –12  28  52  8 24
13 Oct 08  21 Oct 08  14 Oct  US announces that it will use TARP to 
recapitalise banks  –103 19 –122  –73  –191  –59 –90
21 Oct 08  20 Nov 08   Developing countries in financial 
distress seek help from IMF: Belarus 
(22 Oct), 
Iceland (24 Oct), Ukraine and Hungary 
(26 Oct)  92 41 52 58  216 55 39
    17 Nov  Citigroup to slash 52,000 jobs; sees 
hard 2009       
20 Nov 08  07 Jan 09  23 Nov  An extensive rescue package aimed at 
Citigroup is announced  –78 –38 –40  –51  –213  –37 –12
    25 Nov  Fed announces TALF and purchase of 
obligations and MBS of GSEs     
    02 Dec  Extension of several liquidity facilities 
to 30 Apr       
07 Jan 09  15 Jan 09  12 Jan  Concern spreads that Citigroup may 
seek more government help  87 8 79 83  163 45 55
    15 Jan  Citigroup: $18.1bn loss in Q4       
15 Jan 09  12 Feb 09 16 Jan  US government finalises loss-sharing 
programme with Citigroup and enters 
into a programme with Bank of 
America  –37 –1 –36 –21 –47 –41 –39
12 Feb 09  22 Feb 09     92 3 89  65  149  57 94
22 Feb 09  27 Feb 09 23 Feb  Joint statement by FDIC, FED, 
Treasury, Comptroller and Thrift 
Supervisor that they will stand behind 
the US banking system  –31 4 –35  –16  –48  –27 –32
    25 Feb  Stress tests announced       
27 Feb 09  08 Mar 09 02 Mar  Further actions aimed at AIG  126 19 107  133  188  80 101
08 Mar 09  17 Mar 09 09 Mar  Citigroup announces return to 
profitability in Q1 2009  –78 –7 –71  –71  –80  –71 –90
17 Mar 09  30 Mar 09   Details of PPIF released; TALF 
extended 66 –17 83  69  95  42 57




The developments in the US banking sector generated significant spillover effects on banks 
in the euro area.
54 The announcement of the draft law for TARP on 19 September was 
followed by an immediate improvement in CDS premia in Europe. In the following weeks, 
European CDS spreads widened in connection with the difficulties encountered by the US 
administration in converting the plan into legislation and decreased again when the plan was 
finally approved, well before the announcement of any measure by euro area governments. 
However, the improvement of European CDS premia before the announcement of the rescue 
plans (which took place between 13 and 14 October)
55 probably also reflected the fact that, 
given the ongoing discussions on international cooperation (the G20 finance ministers and 
central bank Governors met on 11 October, and EU leaders agreed on guidelines for national 
bank rescue plans on 12 October), investors had already anticipated the interventions before 
their announcements.  
The reduction in premia continued until 21 October, reabsorbing most of the hike registered 
after Lehman’s collapse. From end-October to the beginning of January, the CDS premia of 
large euro area banks remained stable, suggesting that government interventions had 
restored confidence in the banking system. 
The dynamics of the CDS spreads of UK banks were broadly similar to those of euro area 
banks. On 8 October, the UK government announced a rescue package including CI and 
DG. The measures started to be implemented on 13 October, as new capital was injected 
into RBS, Lloyds TSB and HBOS. CDS premia dropped significantly until 21 October. As in 
the euro area, banks’ CDS premia stabilised in a fairly tight range in the following weeks. 
In early 2009, CDS spreads resumed their upward trend in all European countries, due to 
heightened concerns over the effects of the global economic recession. CDS premia 
improved again after mid-March, owing to the flow of positive news from international banks 
and the emergence of “green shoots”. 
2.2  Impact on stock prices 
To examine how banks’ equity prices reacted to government interventions, in this section we 
carry out an analysis similar to that performed in Section 2.1 on CDS premia. We use 
different methodologies (event study, market-level analysis and country-level analysis), 
obtaining similar results: overall, we find no evidence of a significant response of bank stock 
prices to government interventions.  
In what follows, we report only our main results. In Section 2.2.1, we assess the market-wide 
impact of announcements of comprehensive rescue packages, carrying out an event study. 
In Section 2.2.2, we briefly discuss cross-country differences in the behaviour of stock prices.   
2.2.1  Market-level analysis   
Our event study focuses on the same countries and the same events considered for CDS 
spreads in Section 2.1.
56 For each announcement date (denoted by t*), we (i) take the time 
series of each country index between t
*–25 and t
*+25, (ii) re-scale the index to be equal to 
                                                  
54   Timeline tables similar to Table 2.5 for the main euro area countries and for the United Kingdom are available 
from the authors upon request. 
55   With the exception of Italy, which had already announced possible capital injections on 8 October. 




*–1 and (iii) average the time series thus obtained across announcements. Results 
are reported in Figure 2.6.  
Figure 2.6 
Bank stock prices: market-level analysis by type of measure
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Asset purchases and guarantees
1     The symbol t* denotes the day on which government interventions are announced. Results are reported 
separately for capital injections, debt guarantees and asset purchases and guarantees. 
Sources: Bloomberg; company and government/central bank websites; press reports; authors’ calculations. 
 
The announcements of comprehensive rescue packages do not seem to have had a positive 
impact on banks’ equity prices. Immediately after the announcements, bank stocks 
experience modest gains. However, banks’ equity prices resume their pre-announcement 
downward trend just a few days after the announcements. Over a 25-day horizon, they fall 
15–20% below their pre-announcement level. No significant differences seem to emerge 
looking at the breakdown by type of measure.  
The behaviour of stock prices is, on the other hand, heterogeneous across countries, but 
only in the days immediately after the announcements (see Figure 2.7). The stock market 
impact of the measures is positive in Germany, Spain and, to a lesser extent, Japan (with 
gains of about 5%). Over the entire 25-day period, however, stock prices fall substantially 
below their initial level in all countries. 
Figure 2.7 
Changes in bank stock prices: market-level analysis by country
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1   Cumulative change in stock prices after government interventions. The symbol t* denotes the day on which 
government interventions are announced. 




These results suggest that, although the rescue packages contributed to reducing the 
probability of default of banks, they were not sufficient to improve the attractiveness of 
investments in bank stocks. Government interventions reduced banks’ riskiness but could not 
improve investors’ expectations of their profitability. In fact, the stronger capital base 
provided by government capital injections made banks less risky and more resistant to 
shocks, but diluted investors’ earnings rights. Furthermore, the fact that national 
governments became important stakeholders of banks, mostly without a clear exit strategy, 
may have negatively affected investors’ perceptions about the long-run profitability of banks. 
2.2.2 Country-level  analysis 
Country-level analysis indicates that the reaction of stock prices to key announcements was 
homogeneous across banks and countries, if we exclude the very short-run impact. Hence, 
we do not report a detailed description for individual countries, as we did for CDS, but just 
summarise the main results. 
As mentioned, government intervention did not generally provide much relief to bank stocks. 
A notable exception was the announcement of the draft law for TARP on 19 September, 
which revived bank stock prices both in the United States and in the other countries in our 
sample. The stock prices of US banks also rose significantly in the time window from 
20 November to 7 January, when several other intervention measures were announced.  
If these two exceptions are left aside, government interventions were only temporarily 
successful in stopping the decline in bank stocks. In European countries (with the exception 
of Switzerland), the decline in share prices was pronounced even in the period from 
29  September to 21 October (which includes the announcement of the government 
interventions), in spite of the improvement in CDS premia in that time frame. 
Rather than reacting to government interventions, stock prices seemed much more 
responsive to news on the future profitability of banks. For example, stock prices rose 
significantly after Citigroup announced, on 9 March, that the bank had returned to profitability 
in the first two months of 2009 and was expected to remain profitable throughout 2009. Other 




Annex Table 1 
Large international banks included in the sample 
Australia France  Germany  Italy  Japan 







Deutsche Bank  Intesa SP  Mizuho 
Nat Austr Bank  Natixis  Bayerische H  Mediobanca  Sumitomo 
Suncorp Metway  Soc Gén    Monte dei 
Paschi 
 
Westpac       Pop Milano   
     Unicredit   
Netherlands Spain  Switzerland United 
Kingdom  United States 
ING Banco 
Popular 
Credit Suisse  Barclays  Bank of 
America 
SNS BBVA  UBS HBOS  Citigroup 
 Santander    HSBC  Goldman 
Sachs 
     Lloyds  TBS  JPMorgan 
     RBS  Morgan 
Stanley 




3.  Guaranteed bonds  
Over the last few months, the issuance of government-guaranteed bank bonds has been 
sizeable across regions and has provided banks with an important source of funding. As of 
end-May 2009, roughly 900 bonds totalling around the equivalent of €700 billion had been 
issued worldwide by more than 140 banks. In the period from October 2008 to May 2009, 
issuance of guaranteed bonds in all regions accounted for roughly 50% of total bond 
issuance by banks. This section examines first the quantities issued at both country and 
bank level, with a view to examining possible crowding-out effects. The analysis then turns to 
the factors underlying the significant tiering of spreads observed across issuers. 
3.1  Features of guaranteed issuance: size, currencies, maturities 
Evolution of issuance and spreads. In Figure 3.1 (left-hand panel), we show the evolution of 
the issuance of guaranteed bonds per currency. In October–November 2008, the volume 
issued was subdued, as only European banks were issuing. Between December 2008, when 
US and Australian financial institutions started to issue, and March 2009 total issuance 
picked up, with the US dollar becoming the main currency of denomination. The issuance in 
euros remained stable, while the share of other currencies (sterling, yen, Australian dollar) 
increased sharply. In April and May, the issuance of guaranteed bonds remained strong, in 
spite of the increase in investors’ appetite for risk.
57 
The evolution of guaranteed bond prices was apparently unrelated to the evolution of 
quantities: the average spread over the asset swap of a basket (iBoxx by Markit) of euro-
denominated guaranteed issues with two-year maturity has been rising in a step-wise 
fashion, reaching in April a range of 80–100 basis points, and stabilising thereafter 
(Figure 3.1, right-hand panel). 
Figure 3.1 
Issuance and swap spreads of guaranteed bonds 
Monthly issuance


















Nov 08 Dec 08 Jan 09 Feb 09 Mar 09 Apr 09 May 09
1  Amounts converted into euros using the exchange rate of the day of issuance, in billions of euro.    
2  The most 
relevant are sterling and the Australian dollar.       
3    Daily spreads, in percentage points, are calculated as the 
difference between the yield of the iBoxx index of euro-denominated guaranteed bank bonds and the two-year 
swap rate on euros. 
Sources: Dealogic; Markit. 
 
                                                  
57   BIS (2009) provides a number of indicators showing that “risk tolerance” in financial markets increased 
significantly starting from mid-March 2009. 
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Size, maturity and currency. The average size of the bonds issued over the reference period 
differed significantly across countries, mainly reflecting the investor class at which bonds 
were targeted: average size was very large in Germany (€3.4 billion), and between 
€1.1 billion and €2.3 billion in France, Belgium, the Netherlands and the United States. It was 
below €1 billion in the other countries, with Australian and Irish banks opting for small 
issuance size, below €300 million (Table 3.1). 
The average maturity at launch ranged from below two years in Ireland and Denmark to 
more than three years in the Netherlands, Austria and Australia (Table 3.1). Most bonds will 
expire in 2012 (more than €300 billion; Figure 3.2), suggesting that funding problems may 
well arise in that year.  
While 14 different currencies of denomination were used, 40% (362) of guaranteed bonds 
are denominated in US dollars, reflecting the large issuance by US banks in domestic 
currency (Figure 3.1, left-hand panel). The euro is the denomination currency of 222 issues, 
sterling of 68 and the Australian dollar of 54, while a minor role is also played by other 


















No of bonds 
issued 
Average size 







Australia  60.8 14  202  0.3 42 
Austria  15.6  4 16  1.0 35 
Belgium  2.0 1 1  2.0  18 
Denmark  11.9 23 97  0.1 18 
France  84.7  2 37  2.3 28 
Germany  109.3  9 32  3.4 16 
Ireland  17.5  7 55  0.3 19 
Luxembourg  0.8 1 3  0.3  16 
Netherlands  41.6  5 30  1.4 45 
New  Zealand  1.8 5 7  0.3  39 
Portugal  4.4 5 5  0.9  37 
Spain  26.3 23 40  0.7 30 
Sweden  17.9  4 66  0.3 32 
United  Kingdom  113.0 10  134  0.8 29 
United  States  192.5 40  168  1.1 32 
1  All data refer to the period October 2008–May 2009.    
2  Amounts were converted into euros at the exchange 
rate of the day of issuance.  
Source: Dealogic. 
 
Number of bonds/issuers. Between October 2008 and May 2009, around 900 guaranteed 
bonds were issued, totalling about €700 billion. Table 3.1 shows that Australia was the 
country with the highest number of bond issues (202), followed by the United States (168) 
and the United Kingdom (134).  
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Since the start of the schemes, 140 eligible issuers have benefited from the state guarantee. 
The bulk of banks and financial institutions are from the United States (40 issuers), followed 
by Denmark and Spain (23). Also in Australia (14), the United Kingdom (10) and Germany 
(9), several banks took advantage of this type of government guarantee. Out of 140 issuers, 
around two thirds (91) issued more than once. 
Figure 3.2 














1  Amounts outstanding, in billions of euro equivalents, of guaranteed bank bonds maturing between 2009 and
2014; as of 31 May 2009. Amounts converted into euros using the exchange rate of the day of issuance. 
Source: Dealogic. 
 
3.2  Did guarantees help banks to refinance?  
The main goal of the schemes providing explicit government guarantees on bank bonds was 
to help banks maintain access to medium-term funding at reasonable cost, offsetting the 
drying-up of alternative sources of funding and the increase in credit spreads. Hence, in 
order to assess the success of the guarantees, one should ask two separate questions. First, 
did guaranteed issuance come at the expense of (ie crowd out) non-guaranteed issuance 
(eg unsecured and covered bonds)? Second, has total (ie the sum of guaranteed and non-
guaranteed) issuance increased, either because guaranteed issuance has offset a decline in 
non-guaranteed issuance or because it has provided indirect support to non-guaranteed 
bonds by reducing banks’ funding liquidity risk (ie the risk that the bank cannot roll over its 
debt)? 
As for the first question, the degree of substitution between guaranteed and non-guaranteed 
bank debt seems to differ across regions (see Figure 3.3 and Table 3.2).
58 In the euro area, 
there seems to have been no substitution between the two classes of securities, as issuance 
of both has been broadly synchronised. Some crowding-out seems to have taken place in 
the United Kingdom, where the decline in non-guaranteed issuance, especially between 
January and April 2009, has been associated with substantial issues of guaranteed bonds. 
                                                  
58   Figure 3.3 and Table 3.2 show gross bank issuance of guaranteed, unsecured and covered bonds in the euro 
area, the United States and the United Kingdom since October 2008. Two caveats apply to the data: (i) in the 
period considered, the dollar has fluctuated in a range of 1.24 to 1.46 against the euro (a 15% dollar 
depreciation), possibly distorting the comparison (data are in euro equivalents) over time and across regions; 
and (ii) commercial paper (CP) represented an additional source of fixed income funding for banks in the three 
regions. However, given the stark difference in maturity (commercial paper typically has one-week maturity in 
the United States and a few weeks in the euro area, while the maturity of bank bonds is around two to three 
years), we examine bonds separately from CP. 
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This negative correlation broke down in May, when an increase was observed for both asset 
classes. The US programme may have made crowding-out effects more likely, as 
guarantees apply to all new issuance unless the bank decides to opt out. However, issuance 
of unsecured debt by US banks was extremely weak from June 2008, well before the start of 
the programme. It is therefore unlikely that guaranteed bonds were issued at the expense of 
non-guaranteed bonds. 
Figure 3.3 
Gross issuance of bank bonds
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1  Cutoff date: 31 May 2009. Amounts converted into euros using the exchange rate of the day of issuance. 
Source: Dealogic. 
 
As for the second question, namely whether total bond issuance has increased, the data 
suggest that overall issuance increased in all three economic regions (Table 3.2). The 
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increase was pronounced in the United Kingdom, where total issuance in Q4 2008 and 
Q1 2009 was, respectively, three and five times larger than one year earlier. In the United 
States, total issuance in the same two quarters was one and a half times larger than one 
year earlier. Finally, for the euro area, the figure in Q4 2008 was roughly unchanged from a 
year earlier but in Q1 2009 roughly one and a half times larger than in Q1 2008. 
Table 3.2 
Gross issuance of bank bonds: 
euro area, United States and United Kingdom
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1  Covered  Total
2007  0  506 211  717  0 289 9 298 0 132  17  149
2008  14  310 207  532  63 113 0 176 41 46  75  162
2007  Q1  0  212 60  271  0 100 4 104 0 48  5  53
Q2  0  166 57  223  0 91 5 96 0 58  8  65
Q3  0  63 39  102  0 59 0 59 0 14  2  16
Q4  0  65 56  122  0 39 0 39 0 12  2  15
2008  Q1  0  64 51  116  0 42 0 42 0 12  1  13
Q2  0  146 52  199  0 56 0 56 0 23  20  43
Q3  0  59 49  108  0 13 0 13 0 7  14  21
Q4  14  40 55  109  63 2 0 65 41 4  40  85
2009  Q1  66  76 41  183  69 4 0 73 36 6  1  42
Q2  37  53 37  127  14 23 0 37 16 20  5  41
Euro area  United States United Kingdom 
 
1    Non-guaranteed bonds include medium-term notes (MTNs) but not ABS and MBS. Amounts were 
converted into euros using the exchange rate of the day of issuance. 
Source: Dealogic. 
Crowding-out of covered bonds. Assessing whether guaranteed bonds have crowded out 
covered bonds is no easy task. Figure 3.3, centre and bottom panels, and Table 3.2 show 
that in Q1 2009 covered bond issuance in the euro area and the United Kingdom was 
contained relative to the previous year (US issuance of covered bonds was equal to zero). 
However, in most countries securities backed by real estate assets experienced difficulties 
well before rescue measures were launched. Hence, it is unclear whether this effect is really 
a consequence of competition from guaranteed issuance. In any case, the announcement in 
early May 2009 that the ECB would purchase €60 billion of covered bonds has had a 
favourable market impact, inducing an increase in issuance from €11 billion to 19 billion 
(Figure 3.3, centre panel) and a decline in yields.  
Information on the yields on the two asset classes suggests that evidence of crowding-out 
effects differs across countries. In countries such as Germany, which has the largest market 
for covered bonds, the yield on covered bonds remains more attractive than that on 
guaranteed bank bonds for both issuers and investors, due to the wedge represented by the 
guarantee fees: in May the swap spread on a basket of covered bonds was equal to about 
75 basis points, while in the previous months the spread at launch on guaranteed bonds 
issued by German banks had on average been close to 25 basis points (see Figure 3.4). 
From the point of view of German investors, covered bonds clearly provide a much higher 
return than guaranteed bonds (although risk may also be somewhat higher). Furthermore, 
the issuing bank is likely to prefer covered bonds, once the guarantee fees it pays to the 
government are added to the spreads of guaranteed bonds: for instance, considering that 
German banks paid a fixed fee of 50 basis points plus the median five-year CDS spread over 
the reference period – which for most German banks is equal to about 45 basis points – the 
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total cost of guaranteed bonds becomes 120 basis points over swap. Of this, only 25 basis 
points are pocketed by investors.  
In other EU countries with large covered bond markets, such as France and Spain, some 
crowding-out may have taken place insofar as guaranteed bonds are a cheaper source of 
funding than covered bonds for issuers (but less attractive for investors, who can obtain 
higher yields on covered bonds).
59 
Figure 3.4 
Spreads of guaranteed and covered bonds 
In basis points 
Spreads of guaranteed bonds






















AT = Austria; AU = Australia; DE = Germany; DK = Denmark; ES = Spain; FR = France; GB = United Kingdom; 
IE = Ireland; LU = Luxembourg; NZ = New Zealand; NL = Netherlands; PT = Portugal; SE = Sweden; US = United 
States. 
1  Spreads over swap rates at launch. Simple averages for 441 bonds issued over the period October 2008–May 
2009.    
2    Spreads over swap rates; monthly averages of daily data for the period January 2007–May 2009. 
Differences between the yield of iBoxx country indices of covered bonds and four-year swap rates on euros. 
Sources: Bloomberg; Datastream; Markit. 
 
3.3  Which countries and banks have been most active in issuing guaranteed 
bonds? 
A few countries account for most of the issuance of guaranteed bonds. The United States 
leads (Figure 3.5), partly due to the fact that guarantees are provided on all bonds unless the 
bank opts out. Robust issuance has also been recorded in the United Kingdom, France, 
Germany and Australia. Another group of countries (the Netherlands, Spain, Ireland, 
Sweden, Denmark and Austria) issued smaller amounts, in a range of €20–40 billion. 
Issuance was smaller in the remaining countries.
60 
                                                  
59   In Spain, the swap spread on covered bonds was equal to 260 basis points; the spread on guaranteed bank 
bonds was on average 80 basis points and, assuming an overall guarantee fee of 100–120 basis points, the 
total cost of issuing guaranteed bonds turns out to be 180–200 basis points. In France, the swap spread on 
covered bonds was equal to 170 basis points; in contrast, the guarantee fee charged by the SFEF agency 
(see Chapter 2) was lower that in other EU countries (the sum of a fixed component of 20 basis points plus an 
average CDS spread component of 40 basis points) and the average swap spread of SFEF-guaranteed bonds 
was below 30 basis points, bringing the overall cost of guaranteed issuance to around 90 basis points. 
60   For a comparison of take-up rates across countries, see Chapter 1. 
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The issuing policy differs across intermediaries. A first group of intermediaries – including 
Lloyds Banking Group and Barclays – used guaranteed and non-guaranteed bonds as 
complementary financing tools.
61 Other intermediaries (eg the two largest Italian banks and 
Rabobank) seem instead to consider the two asset classes as alternative sources of funding 
and chose to tap only the non-guaranteed market (see Figure 3.6). 
Figure 3.5 















AT = Austria;  AU = Australia;  BE = Belgium;  CH = Switzerland;  DE = Germany;  DK = Denmark;  ES = Spain; 
FR = France;  GB = United  Kingdom;  IE = Ireland;  LU = Luxembourg;  NL = Netherlands;  NZ = New  Zealand; 
PT = Portugal; SE = Sweden; US = United States. 
1  Gross amounts issued over the period October 2008–May 2009, converted into euros using the exchange rate 
of the day of issuance; in billions of euro equivalents.    
2  Mainly the Australian dollar, the New Zealand dollar and 
the Danish krone. 
Source: Dealogic. 
 
Another gauge of banks’ reliance on guarantees is the rollover ratio (ie the bank’s issuance 
of guaranteed bonds as a proportion of its matured debt). Although differences exist across 
countries, a common principle of the rescue measures is that the guarantees are granted to 
help banks roll over maturing bonds. Data show that rollover ratios differ significantly across 
banks and countries. For some 50 banks with bonds maturing over the period October 2008–
May 2009, the median ratio was 150%. At the country level (see Figure 3.7), the ratio was 
equal to or below 100% in Germany, the United States and France. The ratio reached 850% 
in the United Kingdom and 700% in Australia. 
                                                  
61   Other intermediaries may have followed similar strategies indirectly. For example, the Spanish Confederation 
of Savings Banks (Confederación Española de Cajas de Ahorros SA) may have issued non-guaranteed bonds 
on behalf of savings banks that issued guaranteed bonds. Crédit Agricole may also have issued guaranteed 




Ten largest issuers of guaranteed and non-guaranteed bonds
1 
In billions of euros 






SFEF Hypo Lloyds Royal Bk Gen El JPMor- Morgan Bank  ING Barclays
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Lloyds Intesa Rabo- Uni CECA
2 Barclays Crédit NordLB Credit BNP
Banking San- bank Credit plc Agricole Suisse Paribas
Group paolo SpA Nederl. SpA SA Group SA
1  Amount of bonds issued by each bank over the period October 2008–May 2009, converted into euros using the 
exchange rate of the day of issuance.    




Rollover ratios of individual banks: country medians
1 








GB AU SE NL AT ES IE FR
2 US PT DK DE
AT = Austria; AU = Australia; DE = Germany; DK = Denmark; ES = Spain; FR = France; GB = United Kingdom; 
IE = Ireland; NL = Netherlands; PT = Portugal; SE = Sweden; US = United States. 
1  The rollover ratio is the ratio of guaranteed issuance to non-guaranteed matured debt over the period October 
2008–May 2009, for 45 banks with bonds maturing over the period.    
2  Dexia Credit Local. 
Source: Dealogic. 
 
The banks that were most active in issuing guaranteed bonds (in terms of sheer size) are 
larger than average (see Figure 3.8, left-hand panel) and have a high volume of writedowns 




Issuance of guaranteed bonds, bank assets and bank writedowns
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1    Issuance of guaranteed bonds was calculated for 47 banks over the period October 2008–May 2009. 
Writedowns for 21 banks (right-hand panel) over the period October 2008–May 2009 were taken from Bloomberg. 
Total assets (left-hand panel) for these banks refer to the end of 2007, converted into euros at market exchange
rates. 
Sources: Bloomberg; Dealogic. 
The fact that large banks have issued large amounts of guaranteed bonds is not surprising. 
These banks have registered large volumes of writedowns, which in turn provide strong 
incentives to rely on guarantees in order to avoid the high spreads they should otherwise pay 
on unsecured debt. In contrast, the amount and the intensity of guaranteed issuance are not 
correlated with bank liquidity (proxied with the ratio of deposits to total liabilities) and 
capitalisation (measured with core capital ratio).  
Although these findings are not surprising, they may raise concerns on the efficiency effects 
of the programmes, which de facto subsidise large and complex financial institutions, that 
according to some commentators were at the root of the ongoing crisis
62 and may be less 
likely to use the funds raised to increase lending to the real economy.
63 
3.4  The investor base 
Market analysts and international organisations provide information, mostly survey-based, 
about the investor base of guaranteed bonds in the euro area. Two results seem particularly 
relevant. First, a large portion of guaranteed bonds (much higher than for non-guaranteed 
bank bonds) is bought by domestic investors (eg German bonds are mostly purchased by 
German investors). Second, banks are the main investors in guaranteed bonds, with a higher 
share than in the case of non-guaranteed bonds.
64 
These facts may signal further inefficiencies induced by the rescue measures. Foremost is 
the fact that guarantees seem to be part of the process of partial re-segmentation of the euro 
area bond market, previously one of the sectors in which the integration fostered by the 
launch of the euro had been highest. Moreover, the dominant role of banks among investors 
 
62   For example, Wolf (2009) argues that “We are painfully learning that the world’s mega-banks are too complex 
to manage, too big to fail and too hard to restructure”; see also Partnoy (2009). For an in-depth analysis of the 
(weak) relationship between M&As, size and efficiency in the banking sector, see Pilloff and Santomero 
(1998), Amel et al (2004) and Ferguson et al (2007). 
63   See, for example, Roubini and Richardson (2009). 
64   See ECB (2009), Deutsche Bank (2009) and The Wall Street Journal (2009). 
60 
  
implies that these bonds de facto subtract resources from the interbank market and do not 
stimulate bank lending to the real economy, but just lending to other banks.  
Problems may also arise from the fact that guaranteed bonds are purchased by investors 
seeking exposure to sovereign risk, as opposed to corporate credit risk, and with a longer 
time horizon than unsecured debt investors. Although in the short term the fact that 
sovereign risk investors have “stepped in” may have reduced crowding-out effects, the 
problem remains that investors who used to purchase unsecured bonds, which carry 
corporate credit risk, may have become accustomed (or even addicted) to investing in low-
risk guaranteed bank bonds, which instead imply exposure to sovereign (or quasi-sovereign) 
risk. In the medium term, after guarantees are removed, it may not be easy to revert to 
normal conditions, where investors monitor banks and price bonds according to the 
characteristics of the issuer. In other words, unless banks return quickly to soundness, 
convincing the “credit risk seeker” investor base to resume investing in unsecured debt may 
turn out to be an expensive task, with potential adverse consequences for the real economy. 
3.5  Factors affecting demand and supply of guaranteed bonds 
3.5.1  Pricing of state guarantees 
All governments providing guarantees on bank liabilities charge a fee for the insurance. 
However, the criteria followed to set the fees in the United States and Europe differ on two 
grounds (see also Chapter 1). 
The first difference is represented by the mechanism for determining the fee. While the US 
authorities charge a flat fee, which depends only on the maturity of the bond, in Europe the 
cost of the guarantee is also based on each bank’s CDS spread over a given time window.
65 
The European market-based fee represents, at least to some extent, a tax levied on banks 
according to risk (guarantors are likely to break even, and may even profit). In contrast, the 
US flat-fee system has been characterised as a subsidised system, in which the government 
and “strong” banks subsidise “weak” banks.
66 
The second important difference between the US and the European pricing scheme has to 
do with optionality of participation. In the United States, all financial institutions participate in 
the programme unless they opt out. And if they do not opt out, then all their senior unsecured 
liabilities will be insured by the FDIC. In contrast, in Europe participation is optional at the 
level of each single bond issue. This difference clearly affects the take-up rate of the 
guarantees. Moreover, it will probably influence the medium-term ability of the banks to stop 
relying on government support: in a way, the European system will probably lead to what 
economists call a “separating outcome”, as the mechanism may reveal to markets which 
intermediaries are “stronger” and which are “weaker”, allowing banks to raise debt and equity 
accordingly. In contrast, the US opt-out system is more likely to lead to a “pooling outcome”, 
in which institutions are very likely to ask for guarantees, preventing markets from 
discriminating among them on the basis of credit risk. According to some commentators, the 
                                                  
65  In more detail: in the United States, the current rate for FDIC-insured depository institutions for maturities of 
one year or more is a flat fee of 100 basis points. In contrast, the United Kingdom and euro area countries 
follow the ECB guideline, which recommends, in the case of a bond with maturity over one year, a flat fee of 
50 basis points augmented by each bank’s median five-year CDS spread observed over a specified time 
window (January 2007–August 2008). Australia, which is the third largest issuer of guaranteed bonds after the 
United States and the United Kingdom, slightly differs in that it applies a rating-related fee (which goes from 
70 basis points for a AAA rating to 150 basis points for a BBB-rated or unrated bank). 
66   See, for example, Acharya and Sundaram (2008). 
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“separating outcome” is more likely to ensure that lending markets will continue to function in 
an orderly way once the guarantees are removed.
67 
3.5.2  Timeliness of payments 
The timeliness of payments in case of default is a key determinant of the spreads investors 
require on guaranteed bonds. At least two different approaches have been followed by 
countries on how to honour the guarantee in case a bank is unable to make payments on 
interest or principal. The French authorities have devised a prepayment structure by setting 
up an agency (SFEF) which issues the bonds on behalf of individual institutions. Under this 
system, banks wanting to receive proceeds from SFEF have to provide collateral. In order to 
ensure the timeliness of payments, the participating banks receive a collateral call at least 
13 days prior to a payment date. The participating bank has to transfer the required amount 
to SFEF at least three days before the payment date, otherwise SFEF will ask the 
government to activate the guarantee and the government will cover any shortage in one 
day. Hence, the funds needed to service the bond will be available at least two days before 
the payment date. 
All the remaining countries follow a different approach, which provides for the guarantor to 
step in, upon request, only after the issuer has failed to pay on the due date.
68 Australia, 
Germany, Ireland and the United Kingdom provide details on the procedures in case of 
default and explicitly refer to a grace period before the guarantee becomes effective. 
Australia and Ireland commit to the shorter grace periods, whereas Germany and the 
Netherlands commit to longer periods (see Table 3.3). Other countries do not provide details. 
 
Table 3.3 
Timeliness of payments 
In days 
Grace periods for bonds 
Country  Grace period for interest payment  Grace period for principal payment 
Austria 5–30    5–30 
Australia 10  10 
Germany 30  30 
Ireland 14–15  7 
Netherlands 14–30    7–30 
Portugal 10–14    10–14 
Sweden 10–30    10–15 
United 
Kingdom  14–30   7–14 
Source: RBS (2009).   
                                                  
67  See Acharya and Sundaram (2008). These authors acknowledge that their assessment is predicated on a 
“benign scenario” about the evolution of the financial crisis. Should the crisis deepen further (a “pessimistic 
scenario”), the “separating outcome” could push some weak banks into bankruptcy, resulting in a higher 
burden for taxpayers. 
68   See RBS (2009). 
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3.6  What explains the “tiering” of spreads at launch? 
3.6.1 Cross-country  evidence 
A striking feature of guaranteed bonds is the significant tiering of spreads at issuance paid by 
banks. Two issues emerge. First, the spreads at launch are not monotonically related to 
ratings. In some cases, banks with better ratings pay larger spreads than weaker banks from 
other countries. Figure 3.9 shows how wide the range of spreads can be. For example, for 
bonds issued by banks rated A, the range is close to 80 basis points (from 20 points for 
some US banks to 100 points for Spanish banks). 
Figure 3.9 
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S&P rating of issuing banks
1  Includes guaranteed bonds issued in the period October 2008–May 2009. 
Sources: Bloomberg; Dealogic. 
Second, the spreads closely reflect the nationality of the issuing banks. For instance, 
Portuguese banks (Banco Commercial Português, Caixa Geral de Depósitos (both rated A+) 
and Banco Espírito Santo (rated AA-)) paid a much higher spread at launch (90–100 basis 
points over the swap rate) than German banks such as Commerzbank (rated A), Bayerische 
Landesbank and HSH Nordbank AG (both rated BBB+), which paid less than 20 basis points. 
In fact, the guaranteed bonds issued by the Portuguese banks were rated AA, whereas the 
rating of the bonds issued by German banks was AAA. These numbers may explain why 
Banco Bilbao (rated AA) chose to issue guaranteed bonds in the United States and not in 




The country differences between the spreads at launch can be very large (see Figure 3.4, 
left-hand panel). The countries with the smallest spreads are Germany (25 basis points) and 
the United States (32 basis points),
69 while the most expensive issues are those by banks in 
Portugal (96 basis points), Ireland (86) and Spain (81). 
These characteristics of the data are likely to cause inefficiencies and distortions. For 
example, Table 3.4 – which reports the spreads paid by the banks which have issued both 
guaranteed and non-guaranteed bonds
70 – shows that many of the banks that were required 
to pay the highest spreads on non-guaranteed debt are also in the group of banks which 
were able to issue guaranteed bonds at the lowest cost.
71 For instance, Commerzbank paid 
210 basis points over the swap rate for non-guaranteed bonds but only 16 basis points for 
guaranteed bonds. For Barclays, the difference between the two spreads is even larger 




Spread at launch for the banks which issued 
both guaranteed and non-guaranteed debt
1 








1 COMMERZBANK AG 16 A 1 BARCLAYS BANK PLC 435 AA–
2 NORDEA BANK A/S 26 AA– 2 BANCO ESPIRITO SANTO 300 A
3 GOLDMAN SACHS GROUP  26 A 3 BANCO COMMMERC PORTUG 295 A+
4 JPMORGAN CHASE & CO 26 A+ 4 BANK OF IRELAND 238 A
5 AAREAL BANK AG 29 A 5 JPMORGAN CHASE & CO 218 A+
6 JOHN DEERE CAPITAL CORP 33 A 6 GOLDMAN SACHS GROUP INC 215 A
7 BARCLAYS BANK PLC 34 AA– 7 COMMERZBANK AG 210 A
8 GENERAL ELEC CAP CORP 36 AA+ 8 CITIGROUP INC 208 A
9 ROYAL BK SCOTLND 37 A+ 9 BANK OF AMERICA CORP 205 A
10 BANK OF AMERICA CORP 40 A 10 LLOYDS TSB BANK 200 A+
11 LLOYDS TSB BANK 40 A+ 11 NORDEA BANK A/S 178 AA–
12 CITIGROUP INC 46 A 12 ROYAL BK SCOTLND 153 A+
Top 12 banks with the most expensive non-guaranteed borrowing
 
1  Considering the 25 banks which issued both guaranteed and non guaranteed bonds, the left-hand column of 
the table ranks the banks which paid the lowest rates on guaranteed debt while the right-hand column ranks the 
banks with the highest rates on non-guaranteed debt. For each bank, the spreads over swap are the simple 
average of all bonds issued over the period October 2008–May 2009. The shaded area shows those banks that 
appear in both columns. 
Source: Dealogic. 
3.6.2  An empirical analysis of the determinants of the spreads 
The dispersion of the spreads at launch paid on guaranteed bonds may reflect several 
factors. First, it may reflect the characteristics of the issuer, such as its rating or its legal form 
(ie bank vs non-bank). Second, it may reflect the characteristics of the bonds issued, such as 
the volume issued (a proxy of liquidity) or the maturity. Finally, the spreads may reflect the 
                                                  
69   However, if we considered as French government-guaranteed only the issuance carried out by SFEF, then the 
average spread at launch would drop to 28 basis points. 
70   Over the period October 2008–May 2009, there were 25 banks from eight countries which issued both types 
of debt. 
71   The shaded area shows those banks that appear in both columns. 
72   Note, however, that in order to have access to the state guarantees, banks in Germany, Spain and the United 
Kingdom pay an average fee of around 90–120 basis points. 
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characteristics of the guarantor, such as its rating or the mechanisms it would follow in case 
of default of the issuer (ie the time needed to obtain the refund). In order to distinguish 
among these factors, we run the following cross-sectional regressions on 363 guaranteed 
bonds issued in the period October 2008–March 2009 and for which data on the spread at 
launch are available: 








j j D D D D spread 0  
where   are dummies that characterise the issuer,   are dummies representing 
the characteristics of the bonds, are  dummies of the features of the guarantor and 
 are market condition dummies. Table 3.5 reports the exogenous variables considered 











Breakdown of exogenous variables
1 
Variable Dummies  Breakdown 
Issuance volume  3  Low, medium, high 
Maturity  3  Low, medium, high 
Currency of denomination  3  Euro, US dollar, other currencies 
Rating of bond issue  2  AAA, not AAA 
Issuer rating  4  BBB, A, AA, AAA 
Issuer sector  2  Bank, non-bank financial institution 
Issuer CDS spread  3  Low, medium, high 
Bond issuer frequency  2  Once, more than once 
Sovereign rating   2  AAA, not AAA 
Size of bond guarantees pledged by 
government 
2 Low,  high 
Total resources committed by government to 
all rescue packages (ratio to GDP) 
3  Low, medium, high 
Timeliness of payments in case of default  4  SFEF, fast, medium, slow 
Market conditions  6  Oct 08, Nov 08, Dec 08, Jan 09, 
Feb 09, Mar 09 
1  For continuous variables, we created three dummies: a dummy equal to 1 if the observation is in the first 
quartile; a dummy equal to 1 for the fourth quartile; and a dummy equal to 1 for the second/third quartile. For 
non-continuous variables, the dummy determination was judgmental and reflected the possible values of each 
variable. For instance, sovereign guarantees were broken down into two categories: one for ratings equal to 
AAA, and one for ratings below AAA. 
 
Table 3.6 presents the results of a first regression in which the spread is the function of all 
potentially relevant variables.
73 It is worth noting the signs of the significant coefficients. As 
far as country characteristics are concerned, as expected, a sovereign rating of AAA favours 
                                                  
73   The first column is for the whole sample, the second for the one restricted to multiple issuers only. 
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a reduction of the spread at launch. A large amount of funds pledged by the government for 
guaranteeing bond issuance by banks also reduces the initial spread. 
Table 3.6  
Regression coefficients on selected characteristics 




Rating Govt AAA  –42.3553*** –46.4372***
Commitment LOW  –15.6179*** –13.2807***
Bond scheme HIGH –14.3264*** –11.3500**
Maturity LOW  –10.7367*** –12.8515***
Volume HIGH 0.2427  1.5825  
Currency other than USD –6.1839* –8.5680**
Low issuance rating  –4.1507 –2.8498 
Single issuance –5.5491 
Rating issuer A –7.0366 6.6467  
Rating issuer AA  –5.8947 6.3218  
Rating issuer AAA  –4.8753 9.0894  
Issuer is a bank 8.8772* 16.9396***
CDS HIGH 6.5157* 9.7554*
November 16.4228  11.2259  
December 43.1846*** 40.1024**
January  22.4322  19.5935  
February  22.3998  17.3485  
March 19.0193  16.1179  
Poor timeliness 17.6725** 27.5776***








*, ** and *** asterisks denote statistical significance at 90%, 95% and 99%, 
respectively. 
At the same time, a significant share of GDP devoted to the overall rescue packages 
increases the spread; a possible interpretation is that it signals a systemic weakness of the 
financial system of that country or, in extreme cases, even adverse implications for the public 
sector deriving from the (very large) commitment. A timely repayment in case of default is 
associated with a lower spread, as expected. As regards the characteristics of the issue, 
longer maturities pay larger spreads as do US dollar-denominated bonds (possibly because 
of the supply effects related to the very large volume of issues in the US currency). The 
characteristics of the issuer suggest that riskier banks (ie banks with large CDS premia) pay 
more at launch: this might reflect the fact that a default would inevitably imply a loss for the 
bondholders (eg because of the administrative costs they would bear in order to get the 
funds back), so that the rating of the issuer is not irrelevant even in the presence of a 
guarantee by the government.
74 
                                                  
74   Another explanation is that investors do not really consider governments to be riskless. 
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In a second regression which considers only the subsample of banks that issued more than 
once, we focus on the statistically significant variables (we run the regression in a way that 
all coefficients have negative signs).
75 The results, shown in Table 3.7, confirm the previous 
ones. 
Table 3.7  
Regression results 
Dependent variable: SPREAD AT LAUNCH
Method: least squares
Variable Coefficient Std error t-statistic Prob 
Constant 159.1136 12.1088 13.1403 0.0000
Rating Govt AAA  –36.9772 9.1617 –4.0361 0.0001
Commitment LOW –16.4248 4.1067 –3.9995 0.0001
Bond scheme HIGH –10.3880 4.9677 –2.0911 0.0373
Maturity LOW –11.6171 3.6802 –3.1567 0.0018
Currency other than USD –9.0035 3.5845 –2.5118 0.0125
CDS LOW –10.7583 4.7596 –2.2604 0.0245
High timeliness  –24.2639 6.5120 –3.7260 0.0002
Issuer is a financial institution –16.5356 5.4804 –3.0172 0.0028






A graphical representation of these results is reported in Figure 3.10. The height of the bar is 
the intercept of the regression (159 basis points), which, by construction, represents the 
estimated spread of the weakest issuer, ie the spread which a hypothetical bank would pay 
at launch in the worst case scenario: ie if the guarantor were rated below AAA, if the 
government’s resources committed to all rescue packages with respect to GDP were 
relatively high, if the sheer amount of money pledged to the guaranteed scheme were 
relatively low, if the maturity of the bond were three years or longer, if the bond were 
denominated in dollars, if the issuer were a bank and had a high CDS, if repayment in case 
of default were slow, and if the issuance took place under adverse market conditions. 
The layers of the bar in Figure 3.10 show the contribution of each variable used in the 
regression to the spread (represented by the coefficients in Table 3.7). Each layer can be 
seen as the estimated saving an issuer would achieve if one of the “worst case” 
characteristics foreseen by the intercept were removed.  
The main insight emerging from our results is that the largest component of the spread 
reflects the characteristics of the guarantor, and not those of the issuer. The rating of the 
state, the ratio to GDP of the resources committed by the government for all rescue plans, 
and the sheer resources pledged in the bond scheme add up to 64 basis points (40% of the 
whole possible spread reduction). If we also add the “practicalities” of the reimbursement 
scheme (ie the timeliness of payments in case of default), the value increases to 88 basis 
                                                  
75  In this way, our estimate of the constant (159 basis points) represents the spread paid by the hypothetical 
weakest issuer and each coefficient of the regression measures the potential reduction of the spread. This 
result is obtained by using the dummies in such a way that the value 1 is associated with a lower spread. For 
instance, the coefficient of the first explanatory variable (“Rating Govt AAA”, equal to 36.98) is the spread 
reduction (in basis points) if the guarantor is rated AAA. 
67 
  
points (56%). The characteristics of the issuer instead contribute less than 30 basis points. In 
particular, banks with a good CDS may reduce the initial spread by around 11 basis points. 
As for the issue-specific factors, their combined contribution to the cost of the bond issuance 
is equal to approximately 45 basis points: an issuer could reduce the spread by 21 basis 
points by issuing the bond in currencies other than US dollar and by choosing shorter 














Government  rating is AAA
Low commitment on all bank
rescue programmes to GDP




Issuer is a non-bank
financial institution











1  Results are derived from a regression analysis on 321 issues. The bar shows how much of the estimated 
spread can be attributed to country-specific, bank-specific and issue-specific factors. 
One consequence of this finding (ie the major role of the guarantor in determining the spread 
on guaranteed bonds) is that several banks with “weak” sovereign backing have preferred 
not to issue guaranteed bonds. For instance, the choice of Italian banks to issue non-
guaranteed bonds instead of guaranteed ones may be in part related to the relative costs of 
the two liability classes. In late April, the Italian bank Unicredit issued €1 billion of non-
guaranteed bonds with a maturity of three years. The spread over swap paid at launch was 
190 points. If instead it had issued guaranteed bonds, it can be estimated that the overall 
cost of issuing the bonds (fee and spread) would have been higher, in a range of 210–234 
basis points.
77  
                                                  
76   As an aside, note that the value of the intercept is about the same as the sum of all the coefficients (158 basis 
points). This would indicate that an issuer could in principle, under ideal conditions, engineer the issue so as 
to pay a spread over the swap rate close to zero. 
77  This number has been estimated by adding up four components: (i) the spread at launch (which can be 
estimated in a range between 66 and 90 basis points); (ii) the fixed component of the guarantee fee, equal to 
50 basis points; (iii) the variable component of the fee, namely the median CDS spread over the relevant 
period (44 basis points in the case of Unicredit); and (iv) the 50 basis points add-on fee required by the Italian 
Treasury in the case of bonds with a maturity of two years or longer. The first of the above four components is 
estimated by making use of the regression coefficients. 
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In contrast, banks with a strong guarantor behind them (such as those in the United States or 
Germany) are in a position to issue guaranteed bonds at a much smaller spread and are 
likely to find it cheaper to issue guaranteed bonds. The preference for non-guaranteed bonds 
expressed by some of these banks is probably related to non-price factors, such as stigma 
and, more importantly, conditionality (ie behavioural constraints in lending and in 
management’s compensation and hiring).  
By way of an example, on 16 April JPMorgan issued a $3 billion 10-year bond at 350 basis 
points above the Treasury yield (which was roughly similar to the 10-year dollar swap rate). It 
would have been cheaper to issue a guaranteed bond (with a necessarily shorter maturity, of 
up to three years) paying a 40–50 basis point spread and a 100 basis point fee. Most likely, 
the bank opted out of the guarantee programme in order to signal its good health and avoid 
conditionality on its lending and governance. 
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4.  The effects of the rescue measures on lending supply: a 
preliminary look 
All the measures presented in the previous chapters are meant to strengthen financial 
intermediaries, with the ultimate goal of supporting the supply of credit to the private sector. 
However, the size and timing of the impact of such measures may vary considerably 
depending on whether financial intermediaries decide to use public funds to strengthen their 
balance sheets or to support lending. In this chapter, after a brief description of the 
programmes aimed at providing direct support to selected credit markets, we review the 
recent trends in aggregate bank lending. We then provide some very preliminary and 
qualitative evidence of the effects of the rescue measures on the lending behaviour of 
individual institutions in the United States.  
The assessment of the effects of rescue measures on bank lending is rendered particularly 
difficult by several factors, which call for special caution: (i) it is too early to judge the effects 
of the measures (only a few quarters have elapsed since last autumn), all the more if one 
considers the possibly very long lags before support measures translate into a change in 
lending behaviour on the part of banks; (ii) in recent months, lending behaviour may have 
been affected by other factors that may have confounding effects, such as the adoption of 
large-scale non-conventional monetary policies and, more recently, signals of improvement 
in general economic conditions, which have coincided with rescue measures; and (iii) lending 
standards applied by banks reflect a number of different characteristics, some of which are 
hard to measure, with others that have not yet emerged either because of lags (typically, 
losses) or because they are contingent on regulatory and macroeconomic developments. 
4.1  Measures for improving the supply of credit to ultimate borrowers 
Besides adopting the measures examined in previous chapters, the authorities of a number 
of countries have engaged in direct interventions in selected markets in order to sustain the 
flow of credit to the real economy. Many of these programmes have featured the central bank 
as the buyer (or financer of the purchases). This involvement of central banks is known as 
“credit easing” (as opposed to “quantitative easing”, which is based on the expansion of bank 
reserves). Credit easing implies that the central bank takes more credit risk or term risk onto 
its balance sheet. The rationale behind this policy option is twofold (see Bernanke (2009)): 
(i) concerns about capital, asset quality and credit risk may limit banks’ willingness to extend 
credit, notwithstanding the access of these firms to central bank liquidity; and (ii) there may 
be a need to directly address instability or declining credit availability in critical non-bank 
markets (such as the CP market or the market for ABS), which may insufficiently benefit 
from the expansion of bank reserves.  
The table in the annex to this chapter provides an overview of the measures announced 
since September 2008 in a sample of industrial economies. A number of measures target 
mortgage or housing-related credit markets (eg in Australia, Canada, Spain and the United 
States). The US Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF) is aimed at reviving the 
securitisation market for consumer credit. Other facilities, which purchase CP or corporate 
bonds, support corporate financing in general. All these facilities tend to accept only high-
quality assets and are thus different in nature from measures that deal with distressed or 
“toxic” assets. A case in point is the ECB’s outright purchases of covered bonds, which allow 
banks to better manage the maturity mismatch between their assets and liabilities while 
preserving banks’ incentives for prudent credit risk evaluation and monitoring and limiting the 
Eurosystem’s exposure to credit risk (see Trichet (2009)). 
Where the eligible sellers are the issuers of the targeted securities, the direct financing 
motive is evident. Where the eligible sellers are holders of the targeted securities, the 
immediate impact lies more in liquefying the sellers’ asset portfolio.  
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4.2  Recent trends in bank lending 
After several years of robust growth, in 2008 bank lending to firms and households 
significantly decelerated both in the United States and in the main European countries (see 
Figure 4.1). In early 2009, quarterly annualised growth rates were on average barely positive 
in Europe and outright negative in the United States.
78 
Figure 4.1 
Bank lending to the private sector
1 
Quarterly growth rates, in per cent 
Annual averages

























1  Annualised and seasonally adjusted three-month growth rates. For the United States, 13-week growth rates; for 
the euro area and the United Kingdom, growth rates are adjusted for the effects of securitisation.    
2  For 2009, 
first four months only.    
3  For October and December 2008 data are adjusted for reclassifications of existing
loans of former non-bank institutions (see Troshkin (2008)). 
Sources: ECB; Bank of England; Federal Reserve Board. 
In a downturn, a pronounced deceleration in bank lending is hardly surprising, as it may 
reflect both demand and supply factors. On the one hand, it may be due to a reduction in 
banks’ willingness to lend. On the other hand, it may reflect two other factors outside banks’ 
control: a retrenchment in the demand for funds by borrowers and a deterioration in credit 
risk.
79 
Disentangling supply from demand effects is no easy task. One way of doing it is to look at 
loan pricing conditions. If the decline in lending growth is associated with a rise in credit 
spreads, then the case for a tightening of supply becomes stronger. Following the Lehman 
bankruptcy, spreads between loan rates and the funding rates widened considerably across 
the board until the beginning of 2009 (see Figure 4.2). Since then, they have declined 
somewhat in the United States and in the euro area while remaining broadly unchanged in 
the United Kingdom. Similar patterns have characterised corporate bond spreads.  
However, the credit spreads have probably been influenced by many factors other than 
banks’ willingness to lend.
80 First, the crisis has been characterised by an increase in the 
demand for safe assets that has reduced the yields on government bonds,
81 thus increasing 
                                                  
78  The resilience of bank loans in the United States in the third quarter of 2008 has spurred a debate on the 
dependability of aggregate volumes of bank loans as indicators of risks of a credit crunch. See Chari et al 
(2008), Cohen-Cole et al (2009) and Contessi and Francis (2009). 
79   See, for instance, Berlin (2009). 
80  On this point, see, for example, Bank of England (2009), page 4, and Chari et al (2008). 
81   For the United States on this issue, see Chari et al (2008). 
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spreads. Second, it is well known that credit risk is procyclical, as it tends to rise in 
downturns and fall in expansions.
82 These two factors imply that the rise in spreads seen in 
recent months does not necessarily imply a lower propensity to take risk on the part of 
banks. 
Figure 4.2 
Interest rate spreads on bank loans 
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1  Spread of commercial and industrial loan rates over intended federal funds rate.    
2  For fixed rate (floating rate) 
loans, spreads are computed over the 10-year swap rate (three-month Euribor rate).    
3  Spreads over Bank rate.
Source: National data. 
Another limitation of both volume and spread based indicators of credit conditions is that they 
ignore other factors that affect the availability of funding, such as loan fees and the maturity 
of the loan. Anecdotal evidence suggests that, in 2009, US banks have not only applied 
higher spreads but have also shortened the duration of credit lines to both corporate and 
credit card customers.
83 
Another way of distinguishing between supply and demand effects is provided by bank 
lending surveys. These surveys track changes in the standards and terms of banks’ lending 
policies and the state of business and household demand for loans. In both the United States 
and Europe, since the inception of the crisis credit standard indicators have consistently 
indicated a tightening in banks’ lending policies (see Figure 4.3).
84 According to loan officers, 
this prolonged restriction in bank lending has reflected the deteriorating economic 
environment (at the macro level as well as at the industry or firm specific level), the high 
levels of funding costs and lower tolerance for risk. 
This global tightening trend seems to have peaked in the last quarter of 2008. Since then, 
indicators of lending standards have slightly declined. Nevertheless, the net balance of banks 
reporting tightening has remained positive on both sides of the Atlantic (with the notable 
exception of the corporate loans sector in the United Kingdom, where banks have recently 
reported a slight net easing). For the euro area, there are indications that banks have 
tightened credit standards via non price terms too, eg via reductions in the amount of loans 
and credit lines extended to firms or in the loan-to-value ratio for mortgages. 
                                                  
82   See, for example, Collin-Dufresne et al (2001). 
83   See Ng (2009). 
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1  From Q2 2007, simple average of prime, subprime and non-traditional mortgage loans. 
Source: National data. 
The most recent rounds of the bank lending survey for the euro area contained ad hoc 
questions on the impact of the turmoil on banks’ lending supply.
85 In the survey relating to 
the first quarter of 2009 and to expectations for the second quarter, banks reported that 
government announcements of capital injections and debt guarantees had had a positive 
impact on their access to wholesale funding (see Figure 4.4). The percentage of banks 
reporting an improvement in the access to markets because of government plans increased 
from 34% in the previous quarter to around 50%. The percentage of banks expecting 
government rescue programmes to have a positive effect on wholesale funding conditions in 
the second quarter of 2009 rose to around 60%. 
Figure 4.4 
Banks in the euro area: expected effect at end-Q1 2009 
of government rescue measures on banks’ access to wholesale funding
1 








Basically no impact Some improvement Considerable improvement
on market access in market access in market access
Over the past three months
Over the next three months
1  Distribution of estimated effects of government announcement of recapitalisation support and guarantee of debt 
securities issued by banks on banks’ access to wholesale funding. 
Source: ECB (2009). 
                                                  
85  See ECB (2009). 
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All in all, the latest survey information seems to suggest that the tightening of credit 
standards has reduced somewhat in the most recent weeks, after the implementation of the 
government rescue measures. This finding is insufficient, however, to establish causal 
relationships between these two phenomena. Moreover, at this stage it is premature to 
conclude that the recent improvement in lending standards represents a turning point in the 
credit supply cycle. In fact, bank lending conditions continue to be tight. 
4.3  A preliminary look at bank-level data 
Deeper insights into the impact of rescue measures on bank lending would require analysis 
of bank level data. By looking at single institutions, it is possible to assess, for example, to 
what extent loan growth rates differ between banks that had access to government support 
and others that did not. In this subsection, we take a very preliminary look at individual bank 
data focusing on the US banking system, for which detailed up-to-date information on 
individual banks is available. 
For the banks that have received public equity injections through the Capital Purchase 
Program (CPP), useful indications may be drawn from the monthly lending report published 
by the US Treasury. Available data for the three month period February–April 2009 allow a 
detailed picture to be obtained of the distribution of lending activity across these banks (CPP 
recipients). Total loans of CPP recipients declined by 0.8% in March 2009 and 0.7% in April 
2009. Individual data reveal quite a large deal of variability, though. Figure 4.5 shows the 
distribution of the growth rates of loans in March 2009 for the US banks that are CPP 
recipients, depending on size (proxied by their volume of lending in February). The data 
suggest that the reduction in lending by these US banks can be attributed to the 
intermediaries with the largest volume of loans: the growth rate is positive (around 0.6% on 
average) for banks up to the seventh decile and becomes negative for the three deciles that 
include the largest lenders (this heterogeneity in lending across size groups is confirmed by 
data on consumer and commercial loans). Data for April (not shown) indicate that, for the 
largest deciles, the average monthly growth rates of loans increased somewhat, mitigating 
the cross sectional dispersion by size. It is worth noting that the biggest lenders turn out to be 
also those that have received most of the capital injections. This evidence, of course, needs 
to be confirmed by further data in order to ensure that it does not reflect short-run 
movements only. 
Bank level data also allow a comparison of loan growth rates between banks that have 
received government support and others that have not. It is, however, too early to carry out 
such an analysis, given the very short period of time that has elapsed since the introduction 
of the rescue measures.
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86  A different dataset that includes US-listed banks allows a rough comparison to be made between the loan 
growth rates of banks that have received government support and of the other banks. Available data suggest 
that, over the half-year including Q4 2008 and Q1 2009, the growth rate of total loans for banks that have 
received capital injections is in line with that of the other banks. In order to assess the effects of policy 
intervention, it would of course be necessary to have a longer sample period and to go beyond a mere 




US banks that have received capital injections: average growth rates 
of total loans in March 2009 by deciles of loans outstanding in February 2009
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1  Growth rates are not annualised and are not adjusted for seasonality. The graph refers to US banks that have
received capital injections under the Capital Purchase Program. 





Direct support programmes for borrowers and investors 
in key credit markets 
Selected new measures announced since September 2008 
Country  Facility (announcement 
date)  Buyer
1  Seller  Targeted asset(s)/
market(s) 
Australia  Purchase of RMBS 
(26 Sep 08) 
AOFM (under 
Treasury) 
RMBS issuers  RMBS 
Canada  Purchase of RMBS 
(10 Oct 08) 
CMHC (for 
government) 
RMBS issuers  RMBS (CMHC-
guaranteed) 
Euro area  Repos conducted for longer 
maturities (up to one year, 
as announced on 
07 May 09) and against a 
broader range of collateral 




Via the banking 
system 
  Purchase of covered bonds 







issued in the euro 
area 
Japan  CP purchase (19 Dec 08)  Development 
Bank of Japan 
Not specified  Commercial paper 





  Corporate bond purchase 
(19 Feb 09) 




3  Financial Assets Acquisition 







Asset Purchase Facility 

















GSE MBS purchase 




Market MBS  (GSE-
guaranteed) 
 Commercial  Paper  Funding 








  Purchase of agency debt and 




Primary dealers Mortgages and 
MBS (GSE-related)
  Term Asset-Backed 
Securities Loan Facility 







ABS backed by 
consumer credit 
and other credits 
1  AOFM = Australian Office of Financial Management; CMHC = Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation; 
FAAF = Fondo para la Adquisición de Activos Financieros.    
2  Also some ABCP provided that it fulfils certain 
criteria.    
3  See also euro area.    
4  Three-month unsecured CP and ABCP. 
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